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Chapter 4
VIETNAM’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND
LARGE ECONOMIC GROUPS:  
A DISCUSSION
Nguyen Ngoc Anh and Nguyen Duc Nhat
4.1 Introduction
Vietnam. is. now. at. the. critically. important. juncture. as. the.
country. is.preparing.the.National.Socio-economic.Development.
Strategy. 2011-2020. (NSDS)..The.NSDS.will. guide. the. two. five-
year. plans. in. the. next. decade,. and. provide. key. inputs. for. the.
Eleventh.Party.Congress,. scheduled. to.be.held. in. January.2011..
After.more. than.20.years.of. economic. reform,. changing. from.a.
centrally. planned. economy. into. the. market. economy,. Vietnam.
has. undergone. significant. economic. growth. and. is. expected.
to. become. a. ‘middle-income’. country. in. the. next. decade..The.
country’s.patterns.of.growth.will.change.as.income.levels.change..
Therefore,.to.avoid.the.middle-income.trap.by.sustaining.high.rates.
of.economic.growth.and.poverty.reduction,.Vietnam.realizes.that.
it.needs.to.re-structure.the.economy.and.become.an.industrialized.
country..
The.importance.of.industrialization.as.an.engine.of.economic.
growth. and. development. has. long. been. recognized. by. today’s.
industrialized. and. newly. industrialized. countries.. A. number. of.
explanations.have.been.offered.to.explain.the.empirical.correlation.
between.the.degree.of.industrialization.and.per.capita.income.in.
developing.countries..Productivity.is.higher.in.the.manufacturing.
sector.than.in.the.agricultural.sector..Manufacturing.is.assumed.
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to.be.more.dynamic.than.other.sectors..A.transfer.of.productive.
resources.to.more.dynamic.sectors.contributes.to.growth..Capital.
accumulation.can.be.more.easily.realized.in.manufacturing.than.in.
agriculture..The.manufacturing.sector.offers.special.opportunities.
for.economies.of.scale,.which.are. less.available. in.agriculture.or.
services.(Szirmai,.2008)..Manufacturing.generates.employment.at.
higher.skill.levels,.facilitates.better.linkages.across.the.services.and.
agricultural.sectors,.between.rural.and.urban.areas,.and.between.
consumer,. intermediate. and. capital. goods. industries.. Prices. of.
manufactured. exports. are. less. volatile. and. less. susceptible. to.
adverse. business. cycles,. to. long-term. deterioration. than. those.
of. primary. goods,. making. it. particularly. strategic. in. highly.
commodity-dependent. developing. countries. like. Vietnam.. In.
addition,.industrialization.is.a.critical.tool.in.poverty.eradication,.
employment. generation,. and. regional. development. policies..
Finally,.it.can.spur.technological.upgrading.and.innovation.as.well.
as.productivity.gain.and.is.hence.able.to.play.the.development.role.
more.suitably.than.the.agricultural.sector.(See.Table.4.1)..
Table 4.1: Characteristics of Agricultural versus Industrial Sectors
Characteristics.of.the.
Agricultural.Sector.
Characteristics.of.the.Industrial.
Sector.
Diminishing.returns. Increasing.returns.
Commodity.competition. Dynamic.imperfect.competition.
Extreme.price.fluctuations. Stable.prices.
Generally.unskilled.labor. Generally.semi-skilled.or.skilled.labor.
Irreversible.wages. Reversible.and.more.stable.wages.
Innovation.leads.to.lower.prices. Innovation.leads.to.higher.revenues.
Creation.of.a.feudalist.class.
structure. Creation.of.a.middle.class.
Source: Authors.
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Realizing. the. critical. role. that. industrialization. (and.
manufacturing).plays.in.economic.development,.virtually.all.of.
today’s.industrialized.nations.actively.supported.and.protected.
their. industries. through. specific. policies. and. institutions.
throughout. their. history. of. industrialization. (Lall,. 2004,.
Chang,.2002.and.Chang,.2002)..Following.the.initial.success.of.
economic.reform,.the.government.of.Vietnam.has.recognized.
the. importance. of. industrialization. (and. modernization).
which. is. seen. as. a. central. part. of. the. development. agenda,.
and.to.facilitate.the.transformation.of.the.country’s.economic.
structure. to. that. of. a. modern. industrial. economy.. Vietnam.
has. been. experimenting.with. a. number. of. diverse. trade. and.
industrial.policies.but.much.of.it.has.been.based.upon.wishful.
thinking. rather. than. serious. consideration. and. concerted.
strategy..Earlier.efforts.include.a.number.of.measures.instituted.
to. nurture. infant. industries.1. Nonetheless,. the. industrial.
capacity. created. did. not. always. correspond. to. local. demand.
and. supply. conditions. and. the. developmental. contribution.
of. the. industrial. sector. has. been. well. below. its. potential..
However,.the.world.has.witnessed.profound.changes.in.the.last.
few.decades..Like.other.late.industrializing.countries,.Vietnam.
is. now. in. a. world. in. which. conditions. for. implementing.
industrial.policy.have.changed.to.the.extent.that.it.may.be.very.
difficult. to. adopt. the. industrialization. strategy. followed. by.
now-industrialized.countries.and.the.Asian.Tigers..According.
to. Lall. (2004),. today’s.world. is. different. from. that.when. the.
strategies.of.Asian.Tigers.were. formulated..There.are. several.
factors. affecting. the. changed. environment. for. implementing.
industrial. policies.. Industrial. strategy.must. be. based. on. the.
analysis. of. the. international. situation. and.Vietnam’s. current.
and.future.position.in.it....
1.	 These	includes:	over-valued	(fixed)	exchange	rates	that	kept	imported	capital	
goods	and	intermediate	inputs	relatively	cheap;	FDI	licensing	only	in	selected	
sectors;	 import	 duties,	 drawbacks	 and	 rebates;	 licensing	 arrangements;	 the	
provision	of	direct	loans	and	equity	capital;	and	quotas	allowing	access	to	foreign	
exchange	for	imported	inputs	and	remittances	at	subsidized	official	rates.
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The Global Financial and Economic Crisis 
Since.2008.the.world.has.just.gone.through.a.severe.economic.
and.financial.crisis.since.the.last.great.depression..Although.having.
its.origin.in.the.developed.world,.the.global.crisis.has.far-reaching.
consequences,. and. is. also. expected. to. shape. the. growth. and.
development.prospects.for.developing.countries.including.Vietnam.
for.the.foreseeable.future..The.formulation.and.implementation.of.
industrial.policies.for.Vietnam.should.be.put.in.this.context..One.
of. the.often.cited.structural.causes.of. the.current.global.crisis. is.
the. unsustainable. global. imbalances. between. over-consumption.
in. the. US. (large. current. account. deficit). and. over-saving. in.
emerging. China. and. other. East. Asian. countries. (large. current.
account.surplus)..Such.unsustainable.global. imbalances.must.be.
rebalanced.either.with.a.gradual.decline.or.a.sudden.fall.caused.by.
a.global.crisis.for.example..As.a.result,.the.world.consumption.map.
may.evolve.into.either.a.multi-polar.(with.the.US,.EU,.Japan,.and.
emerging. consumption.Asia,.which. is. the.more. likely. scenario).
or.Asia-centered.single-polar.map..In.either.case,.the.emergence.
of.a.consumption.center.in.Asia.(China,.India.and.other.current.
account. surplus.countries).may.have. important. implications. for.
Vietnam’s.export.strategy,.production.and.industrialization.1
The Accelerating Speed of Technical Change and Globalization 
of Production 
These.are.the.two.important.and.defining.characteristics.of.the.
fast.changing.economic.world.today..Rapid.technical.change.reduces.
the.scope.for,.and.raises.the.risks.of,.some.forms.of.industrial.policy.
as. free. market. forces. are. not. conducive. to. costly. and. prolonged.
learning. processes.. Choosing. wrong. sectors. would. lead. to. costly.
consequences. for. national. development.. Similarly,. globalization. of.
production.network.renders.some.past.industrial.policy.instruments.
less.useful.or.most.risky.and.costly..The.more.detailed.implications.
that.may.have.relevance.for.Vietnam.can.be.found.in.a.study.by.Yusuf.
1.	 See	Nguyen	et	al.	(2010)	for	further	discussion	about	global	imbalances	and	
their	implications	for	Vietnam.
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et.al..(2004).which.concluded.that.in.the.face.of.a.global.environment,.
economies. in.East.Asia.need.to.adapt.to.the.changing.character.of.
global.production.networks.and.to.nurture.and.develop.technological.
capabilities.in.order.to.sustain.their.growth.prospects.1.
Policy Liberalization
. In.1995,.Vietnam.submitted.its.application.for.accession.to.
the.World.Trade.Organization.(WTO).and.became.the.150th.WTO.
member.state.in.2007..Vietnam’s.trade.liberalization.and.accession.
to. WTO. in. particular. has. consequences. for. implementing.
industrial.policies..Like.other.transition.countries,.Vietnam.in.its.
attempt. to. integrate.back. into. the.world. economy.after. years.of.
isolation.has.been.reducing.trade.and.investment.barriers..Many.
effects.of.liberalization.have.been.beneficial,.allowing.Vietnam.to.
exploit.its.existing.comparative.advantages.that.were.held.back.by.
inefficient.controls. in. the.planned.economy.. Increased.exposure.
to. competition. both.within. domestic. and. international.markets.
has. forced. enterprises. to. raise. efficiency. or. go. out. of. business..
However,. policy. liberalization. is. causing. devastating. damage. to.
some. industries. in. Vietnam..Most. important,. the. international.
commitments.under.WTO.agreements.as.well.as.multilateral.and.
bilateral. agreements. (i.e..ASEAN,.US-Vietnam.BTA). to. remove.
trade. interventions,. streamline. FDI. licensing. and. local. content.
requirements,. open. up. and. regulate. government. procurement,.
impose.strict.intellectual.property.rights,.and.liberalize.the.service.
sector. takes. away. the. most. powerful. tool. for. promoting. new.
activities.and.developing.infant.industries.2.
1.	 Multinational	corporations	(MNCs)	of	the	advanced	countries	including	US,	
Japan,	 and	Western	 Europe	 have	 been	 adopting	 global	 production	 network	
concept	 in	 their	 operation.	 This	 suggests	 that	 successful	 participation	 into	
global	production	networks	 is	one	of	 the	necessary	conditions	 for	 industrial	
upgrading	 and	 therefore	 for	 economic	 development	 of	 emerging	 economies	
including	Vietnam.
2.	 These	 commitments	 will	 narrow	 the	 role	 of	 government	 in	 economic	 life,	
and	subject	the	economy	to	competition	and	globalization	more	strongly.	To	
sum	up,	liberalization,	technical	change	and	globalization	mean	that	countries	
are	 faced	with	much	stronger	 technological	and	competitive	challenges	 than	
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Emergence of New Big Players in the Global Economy 
The.emergence.of.big.players.in.the.world.economy.particularly.
China.and.to.some.extent.India,.has.become.a.cause.for.concern.
around. the. world. with. critical. implications. for. developing.
countries. including. Vietnam. (see. Winters. and. Yusuf,. 2007;.
Lora,. 2005;.Mayer. and.Wood,. 2009)..The. economic. resurgence.
of. China. has. sometimes. been. noted. as. a. threat. to. Southeast.
Asia. in. particular,. as. fears. abound. of. a. diversion. of. FDI. and. a.
competitive.disadvantage.in.exports.(Ravenhill,.2006)..China.has.
been. the.world’s. fastest-growing.economy.since. the.close.of. last.
century,.with.an.average.real.growth.rate.of.9.4.percent.per.year..
According. to.Mayer. and.Wood. (2009). the. entry. of. China. into.
world.markets.over.the.past.three.decades.has.affected.the.broad.
sectoral.structures.of.other.economies,.especially.developing.ones..
In.particular,.they.argue.that.the.adversary.effects.of.China.on.the.
labor. intensive.manufacturing. and. the.primary. sectors. in. other.
developing.countries.have.aroused.concerns.and.suspicions.about.
retarded. industrialization,. reduced. employment. and. increased.
inequality. in. Africa,. Latin. America. and. the. rest. of. Asia.. The.
labor-intensive.manufacturing.is.often.said.to.have.been.harmed.
by. competition. from.China.1. In. a. nutshell,. Vietnam,. like. other.
before.	 In	 theory,	 the	 new	 forces	 encourage	 and	 facilitate	 learning.	 They	
increase	 the	 efficiency	 with	 which	 knowledge	 is	 transmitted	 across	 coun-
tries,	and	remove	many	of	the	policies	that	cut	countries	off	from	information	
flows	 and	 distorted	 the	 incentives	 to	 utilize	 them.	The	 exploitation	 of	 new	
technologies	 is	undertaken	with	 increasing	 rapidity	 in	different	 locations	by	
MNCs	or	by	local	firms.	Level	playing	fields	remove	information	barriers	and	
lower	transaction	costs	to	enterprises.	The	same	trends	make	it	more	difficult	
to	mount	industrial	policy,	partly	for	economic	reasons	and	partly	for	political	
ones.	They	 raise	 the	 speed	of	 technical	 change,	 the	quantity	of	 information	
available	and	the	breadth	and	depth	of	skills	and	institutions	needed	to	cope.	If	
countries	are	thrust	into	this	without	the	ability	to	cope,	and	without	the	tools	
to	build	that	ability,	they	will	remain	beggars	at	the	technological	feast.	In	fact,	
they	will	be	more	marginal	than	before,	since	rapid	exposure	to	competition	
would	devastate	their	fledgling	industrial	sectors	and	destroy	the	small	base	of	
capabilities.
1.	 The	primary	production	sector	on	the	other	hand	is	often	said	to	have	gained	
from	increased	demand	from	China.	According	to	Mayer	and	Wood	(2009),	
China’s	 opening	 to	 trade	 effectively	 lowered	 the	 world	 average	 land/labor	
209
latecomer. industrializers,.has. to.dance.“with. the.Giants.without.
getting.one’s.toes.stepped.on”.(Winters.and.Yusuf,.2007)..
This. chapter. seeks. to. provide. inputs. for. the. debates. and.
discussion. along. the. preparation. of. the. national. development.
strategy..The.chapter.focuses.on.the.relevance.of.industrial.policy.
for.national.economic.development.and.the.role.of.large.economic.
groups.as.an.instrumental.tool.for.implementing.industrialization.
policy. for. the. purpose. of. national. economic. development..The.
chapter. is. organized. as. follows.. The. first. section. reviews. the.
policies. adopted. by. Vietnam. during. the. course. of. economic.
development. through. the. lens. of. ‘industrial. policy’. emulating.
the.industrial.policy.framework.adopted.by.other.countries..The.
second.section.focuses.on.the.role.of.large.economic.groups.as.an.
instrument.for.industrialization..The.chapter.is.more.of.a.selective.
review,.discussing.issues.relevant.for.the.policy.review,.debate.and.
discussion.in.Vietnam..The.authors.argue.that.industrial.policy.is.
still.relevant.for.Vietnam.and.large.economic.groups..While.this.
could.be.viewed.as.a.double-edged.sword,. it. is.still.relevant.and.
feasible.for.industrial.policy.implementation.
ratio	and	increased	the	share	of	workers	with	a	basic	education	in	the	world	
labor	force.	The	relative	endowments	of	other	countries	were	thus	shifted	in	
the	opposite	directions,	which	 tended	 to	move	 their	 comparative	 advantage	
away	from	labor-intensive	manufacturing,	which	requires	a	lot	of	workers	with	
a	basic	education	but	not	much	land.	The	corresponding	increase	in	comparative	
advantage	for	developing	countries	was	mainly	in	primary	production,	which	
uses	 a	 lot	 of	 land;	 for	 developed	 countries,	 it	 was	 mainly	 in	 skill-intensive	
manufacturing	 and	 services,	 which	 need	 workers	 with	 more	 than	 a	 basic	
education.	The	mechanism	by	which	this	shift	in	world	average	endowments	
took	effect	was	a	vast	expansion	of	China’s	exports,	concentrated	on	labor-intensive	
manufactures,	in	which	its	own	endowments	give	it	a	comparative	advantage,	
and	of	its	imports,	which	are	concentrated	on	primary	products	and	skill-intensive	
manufactures,	 in	which	 it	has	a	comparative	disadvantage.	These	changes	 in	
trade	 flows	altered	 relative	prices	on	world	markets	 and	 shifted	 the	demand	
functions	faced	by	producers	in	other	countries	–	inwards	for	labor-intensive	
manufactures,	 and	 outwards	 for	 primary	 commodities	 and	 skill-intensive	
manufactures.	 Fu	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 show	 that	 China’s	 exports	 depressed	 global	
manufactures	prices.	
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PART I – INDUSTRIAL POLICY
4.2 Industrial Policy and Development in East Asian 
Countries
Extensive. debate. has. surrounded. both. trade. and. industrial.
policies. in. economic. development.1.There. has. been. a. large. and.
growing.body.of.theoretical.and.empirical.literature.on.the.limits.
and.merits.of.industrial.policies,.rendering.it.impossible.to.cover.
in.details,.all.of.the.theoretical.and.empirical.implications.within.
the.space.of. this.paper..This.section.reviews. the.basic.economic.
theories/rationales. for. government. intervention,. briefly. visiting.
the.contemporary.debate.on.whether.industrial.polices.should.be.
comparative. advantage-conforming. or. comparative. advantage-
defying. (Lin. and. Chang,. 2009).. After. a. brief. discussion. of. the.
definition.of.an.industrial.policy,.I.will.consider.arguments.for.and.
against. industrial.policy..Against. this.backdrop,.we.will.evaluate.
whether. industrial. policy. should. be. adopted. by. developing.
countries.with.special.attention.paid.to.the.experience.of.the.Latin.
American.and.East.Asian.countries.
4.2.1 Definition of Industrial Policy
There.are.a.number.of.definitions.of. industrial.policy.and.
there. is. no. consensus. on. what. exactly. constitutes. industrial.
policy.. Some. authors. argue. that. the. appropriate. term. for.
industrial.policy.should.be.‘selective.industrial.policy’..According.
to. Chang. (1994),. selective. industrial. policy. implies. a. certain.
group.of.policies.that.are.inclined.to.privilege.the.development.
of.a.particular.industry.or.sector.over.others.in.order.to.enhance.
national.economic.or.social.welfare.in.the.long.run..Methods.to.
reinforce.selective.industrial.policy.may.include.trade.subsidies,.
licenses,. and. the.management.of. credit. and.capital. allocation,.
prices. and. investment.. There. are. two. main. definitions. of.
1.	 The	term	“Washington	Consensus”	can	be	broadly	interpreted	to	mean	secure	
property	rights,	fiscal	discipline,	sectoral	neutral	tax	and	expenditure	policies,	
financial	 liberalization,	 unified	 and	 competitive	 exchange	 rates,	 openness	 to	
foreign	trade	and	investment,	privatization,	and	deregulation.
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industrial.policy,.focusing.on.either.the.industry.or.the.market..
Examples.of.the.first.type.include.the.definition.by.Chang.(1994).
as. “a. policy. aimed. at. particular. industries. (and. firms. as. their.
components). to. achieve. the. outcomes. that. are. perceived. by.
the.state.to.be.efficient.for.the.economy.as.a.whole”.or.by.Pack.
(2000).as.comprising.of.“a.variety.of.actions.designed.to.target.
specific.sectors.to.increase.their.productivity.and.their.relative.
importance. within. the. manufacturing. sector.”. On. the. other.
hand,.emphasizing. the.distortion.effect.of. the. intervention.on.
the.market,.Lall.(1996).defines.industrial.policy.as.“comprising.
all.actions.taken.to.promote.industrial.development.beyond.that.
permitted.by.free.market.forces”.1.
4.2.2 Arguments for and against Industrial Policy
The.role.of.the.State.in.a.market.economy.is.one.of.the.most.
controversial. issues. in. economic. theory.. Indeed,. the. strength.of.
the. argument. of. industrial. policy. depends. on. the. appraisal. of.
the. possible. benefits. of. industrial. policies..There. are. a. number.
of.arguments.for.mounting.industrial.policies.that.can.be.found.
in. economic. theory.. Rodrik. (2008). draws. an. analogy. between.
industrial.policies.and.other.government.interventions.in.such.areas.
as.education,.health,.social.insurance.and.even.macroeconomics.
stabilization,.all.of.which.are.motivated.by.externalities,.asymmetric.
information.2.We.could.identify.a.number.of.circumstances.where.
selective. government. intervention. via. industrial. policy. may. be.
designed.to.obtain.an.increase.in.social.welfare..They.include.the.
infant. industry. argument,. economies. of. scale,. knowledge. as. a.
public.good,.and.imperfection.of.factor.markets.3.
1.	 The	World	Economic	Forum	(2002)	defines	industrial	policy	as	“interventions	
to	skew	the	market’s	outcome	in	a	nation’s	favor.”
2.	 Education	 and	 health	 interventions	 are	 motivated	 by	 human	 capital	 externalities,	
social	 insurance	 by	 asymmetric	 information,	 and	 stabilization	 policy	 by	
aggregate-demand	(Keynesian)	externalities.
3.	 A	framework	for	analyzing	the	selective	industrial	policy	should	compare	the	
benefits	 generated	by	 a	promoted	 industry	with	 those	 that	 could	have	been	
generated	if	the	resources	had	been	allocated	to	another	sector	of	the	economy.
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One. of. the. most. accepted. justifications. for. government.
intervention. through. industrial. policy. is. the. “infant. industry”.
argument.. According. to. Chang. (2002),. the. argument. was. first.
developed. by. Alexander. Hamilton. but. is. often. attributed. to.
Friedrich. List.. The. infant. industry. argument. suggests. that.
protection. of. domestic. industries. from. foreign. competition. is.
justified.during.the.early.stages.of.development.of.a.new.industry.
until. sufficient. scale. and. technological. development. have. been.
achieved.1.The. infant. industry. argument. is. based.on. a.dynamic.
theory. of. comparative. advantage. –. looking. at. the. long-run.
interest. for. the. national. economy..The. most. efficient. long-run.
strategy.may.well.be.different.from.what.is.best.initially.2.The.main.
debate. concerning. the. “infant. industry”. argument. concerns. the.
degree. of. protection. that. should. be. imposed. and. exactly. when.
to.phase. it. out..Tension. that. is. often. reflected.with. government.
1.	 It	has	been	argued	that	this	was	precisely	the	industrial	development	strategy	that	
was	pursued	by	countries	like	the	US	and	Germany	during	their	rapid	industrial	
development	before	 the	 turn	of	 the	20th	century.	Both	 the	US	and	Germany	
had	high	tariffs	during	their	industrial	revolution	periods.	These	tariffs	helped	
protect	fledgling	industries	from	competition	with	more	efficient	firms	in	Britain	
and	may	have	been	 the	necessary	 requirement	 to	 stimulate	economic	growth.	
This	strategy	was	later	adopted	by	Japan	and	Korea.
2.	 Imperfection in the capital and goods market is another justification for government 
intervention. If there is a divergence (due to the lenders’ inability to make proper 
evaluations, to their “irrational” aversion to risk, or to their systematic over-estimation 
of the risk, or due to information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers) between 
the social opportunity cost of funds and the available market rate at which the 
potential borrowers can access, then government may intervene with subsidies, tax 
credit if the private rates are not appropriate. Another argument that is often used 
to justify government interventions in economic life is the public good nature of 
knowledge creation in certain specific industries such that the benefits of research 
and development efforts may be spread throughout society inevitably. Government 
intervention in this regard through selective industrial policies may include sub-
sidies for private research and development costs. Particularly,	encouragement	may	
be	created	for	firms	to	internalize	the	externalities	associated	with	the	creation	
of	new	technologies	through	the	promotion	of	 joint	ventures	 for	research	and	
development.	Use	of	production	or	export	subsidies	or	protection	of	the	domes-
tic	markets	through	selective	industrial	policies	can	also	overcome	this	form	of	
market	 failure.	As a summary, Rodrik (2008) argues that it is not a question of 
whether we should have industrial policies, rather it is a question of how.
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“picking.winners”.–.choosing.exactly.which.industries.to.nurture.
–.illustrates.the.complexities.of.a.broad.interpretation.of.the.infant.
industry.argument.
In. addition. to. the. infant. industry. argument,. government.
intervention. may. also. be. justified. by. economies. of. scale. (both.
static.and.dynamic)..For.a.certain.sector.where.the.entry.costs.is.
high.or.the.learning.curve.is.steep,.leaving.only.a.few.firms.capable.
of.entering.the.sectors,. there.is.a.case.for.government.industrial.
policies. in. the. form.of.entry. subsidies. for. the. learning.phase.or.
entry. phase.. The. government. may. also. intervene. for. strategic.
reasons.. Selective. industrial. policies.may. be. undertaken. by. the.
government.to.support.local.firms.in.their.efforts.to.compete.with.
rival.foreign.firms..Classic.examples.include.Boeing.and.Airbus,.
and. the.more. recent. success. of.Chinese. aircraft. industry.. Entry.
subsidies.may.be.considered.because.of. the.potential.monopoly.
profits.obtainable.by.one.firm..
The. issue. of.whether. it. is. better. for. a. country. to. engage. in.
free.trade.with.other.countries,.or.to.limit.trade.through.industrial.
or.trade.policies.has.been.a.contentious.one.for.both.economists.
and.policymakers..One.counter-argument. to. the. infant. industry.
argument.above.is.that.by.protecting.infant.industries,.countries.
are. not. allocating. resources. in. the. short-run. on. the. basis. of.
comparative. advantage..The. standard. neoclassical. trade.models.
of. trade. show. that. resources.will. be. allocated.most. efficiently. if.
countries.produce. those. goods. in.which. the.before-trade.prices.
are.lower.than.in.the.rest.of.the.world......
4.2.3 Experiences from East Asian Countries
Although,.the.East.Asia.region.also.suffers.from.some.economic.
setback.such.as.the. lost.decade.of.economic.stagnation.in.Japan.
(in. the.90s).and. the.Asian.Financial.Crisis. in.1997,. it.continues.
to.be.the.best.performer.in.terms.of.sustained.economic.growth.
and.poverty.reduction.in.comparison.to.Latin.America.or.Africa..
Many.researchers,.policy.makers.and.governments.have.turned.to.
East.Asia. to. explore.why.East.Asian. countries. are. so. successful.
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and.if.East.Asian.countries.could.serve.as.a.model.for.economic.
development..These. countries. have. derived. great. benefits. from.
increasing. integration. with. the. international. economy,. without.
giving.up.national.autonomy.in.the.economic.or.cultural.spheres,.
by. pursuing. decidedly. non-neutral. policies. with. respect. to. the.
promotion.of.specific.sectors.and.activities..This.chapter.addresses.
a.series.of.questions.in.an.attempt.to.assess.the.relevance.of.their.
experiences.for.Vietnam..These.questions.include:
•	 Was. industrial. policy,. defined. as. selectively. promoting.
individual.sectors,.a.major.source.of.growth.in.these.East.
Asian.economies?
•	 Can.these.outcomes.be.duplicated.in.Vietnam.today,.or.
do.special.circumstances.or.changes.in.the.international.
policy.environment.prevent.replication.of.the.East.Asian.
experience?
•	 Given. the. revealed. costs. and. benefits,. is. replication.
advisable?.And,. if. not,. are. there.other,. positive,. lessons.
that.Vietnam.can.take.away.from.the.historical.experience.
of.the.East.Asian.countries?
According.to.previous.studies.(e.g..Crafts.1998;.Wong.and.Ng.
2001;.World.Bank,.2003).the.economic.growth.and.development.
in. East. Asian. countries. (Japan. and. the. “Four. Tigers”. and. to.
some.extent.Malaysia,.Thailand.and.Indonesia).during.the.last.
decades.of.the.last.century.is.a.miracle..The.income.per.capita.
increased. more. than. tenfold. in. Japan. and. the. “Four. Tigers”.
between. 1950. and. 1995,. and.more. than. doubled. in.Malaysia,.
Indonesia. and.Thailand. in. the. two. decades. after. 1973. (Crafts.
1998;.Wong.and.Ng,.2001).. In.addition,.growth.was. relatively.
equally. distributed,. bringing. reductions. in. absolute. poverty.
and.improvements.in.living.conditions..The.economic.take-off.
and.success.of.China.over.the.last.two.decades.has.added.to.the.
regional.success.
Although. the. conditions. for. implementing. industrial.
policies. that.were. adopted.by. the.Asian.Tigers.have. changed. as.
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discussed. above,. and. several. authors. (Noland. and. Pack,. 2005).
have.argued.that.developing.countries.can.no. longer. implement.
the. successful. policies. of. the. Asian. Tigers,. there. are. still. a.
number.of.lessons.that.can.be.learnt.from.the.experience.of.these.
countries..According.to.the.World.Bank.(1993),.the.Asian.Tigers.
all. had. sound.macroeconomic.management,. a. good. initial. base.
of. human. capital. and. strong. export-orientation..They. provided.
stable.and.predictable.incentive.frameworks.for.investment..They.
had.high.rates.of.savings.and.investments.—.some.of.the.highest.
in.recent.history.—.which.financed.investments.in.the.hardware.
and. software. of. learning.. They. invested. in. administrative. and.
institutional.capital,.both.necessary.in.making.markets.work.better.
and.in.mounting.effective.policies..Their.governments.had.close.
and.continuous.dialogue.with.the.private.sector,.and.the.granting.
of.privileges.was.closely.monitored.and.made.to.depend.on.export.
performance..They.used.“contests”.to.monitor.performance.and.to.
ensure.that.favors.were.returned,.unlike.in.other.countries.where.
privileges.were.generally.granted.to.industry.with.no.monitoring.
or. performance. requirement.. Finally,. they. benefited. from. their.
location,. being. near. Japan. and. what. became. the. world’s. most.
dynamic. region..They. interacted. with,. and. learned. from,. each.
other..They.gained. from.the.spillovers.of.a. favorable. investment.
image”.(Lall,.2004).
What. was. ignored. by. neoclassical. analysts. was. that. these.
common. elements. went. together. with. striking. differences. in.
development. “visions,”. which. shaped. crucial. elements. of. their.
strategies,.each.involving.different.kinds.and.levels.of.intervention..
It.is.difficult,.in.fact,.to.describe.their.policies.as.“remedying.market.
failures”.in.the.conventional.sense..The.Tigers.were.not.trying.to.
make.markets.work.better.to.achieve.some.static.equilibrium..They.
were.choosing.between.countless.potential.equilibria,.and.bending.
their.resources.to.obtain.the.ones.they.had.(more.or.less.clearly).
selected..Though.there.were.generic.problems.they.addressed. in.
similar.ways.(improving.the.technology.infrastructure.or.providing.
basic. education. and. training),. they. used. various. tools. of. policy.
differently.to.pursue.their.different.visions.(Lall,.1996)..Since.they.
were.all. successful. (to.a.greater.or. lesser.extent),.because.of. the.
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coherence.of.their.policies.and.good.administrative.capabilities,.it.
was.clear.that.there.are.not.only.“many.roads.to.heaven”.but.also.
many.heavens..The.tools.were.not.that.different.from.those.used.in.
less.successful.economies.—.the.secret.lies.in.the.combination.of.
policies.and.the.efficacy.of.their.implementation.
4.2.4 Key Considerations for Successful Government Intervention
There.are.two.types.of.government.intervention,.often.known.
under.the.terms.functional intervention and selective intervention. 
While. functional. interventions. are. designed. to. remedy. generic.
market.failures.without.favoring.one.activity.over.another,.selective.
interventions.are.designed.to.remedy.market.failures.for.specific.
activities/sectors/industries/activities.. Functional. interventions.
are. often. preferred. to. selective. interventions. because. of. the.
risks. (of. “picking.winners”).associated.with. the. latter.. It. should,.
however,.be.noted.that.economic.theory.provides.valid.arguments.
for. selectivity. under. certain. types. of.market. failures..According.
to. the.World.Bank,. in.order. for.national. industrial.policy. to.be.
successful,.it.is.necessary.to.have.three.sets.of.factors.viz..incentives,.
capabilities,.and.institutions..
Incentives. as. provided. by. industrial. policies. will. guide.
the. allocation. of. resources. and. also. the. efforts. invested. in.
developing.competitive.capabilities..
Capabilities arise. from. physical. investment,. infrastructure,.
human.capital.development,.and.technological.effort..
Institutions. of. various. kinds. facilitate. capability. formation.
and. production. where. purely. market-based. forces. are.
deficient..
Successful. implementation. of. industrial. policy. requires. not.
just.one.set.of.factors.but.also.the.interplay.between.these.sets.of.
factors..A.balance.of.appropriate.incentives,.capability.development.
and. institutional. support. is. necessary.. The. nature. and. balance.
depend.on.each.country’s.endowments,.levels.of.development.and.
inherited.structure.and.institutions...
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The.above.discussion.of.successful.industrial.policy.rests.on.the.
assumption.of.effective.government..In.practice.governments.often.
lack. the. skills,.knowledge,.objectivity,.or.autonomy. to.carry.out.
interventions.effectively.and.efficiently..Therefore,.consideration.of.
government.failures.should.clearly.be.an.integral.part.of.industrial.
strategy..Neither.markets.nor.governments.can.be.assumed.to.be.
perfect...The.examples.of.highly.successful.industrial.intervention.
in.East.Asia.(to.be.discussed.in.the.next.section).suggest.that.under.
certain.circumstances.government.failures.can.be.minimized.and.
market.failures.remedied..But.many.examples.of.failed.government.
intervention.are.found.in.Latin.America.and.Africa..Therefore,.the.
role.and.capacity.of.government.is.critical.for.successful.industrial.
development.
4.3 A Review of Vietnam’s Industrial policy
4.3.1 A Brief Overview of Economic Reform and Performance
The. failure. of. the. centrally. planned. model. that. Vietnam.
followed. to. develop. its. national. economy. after. the. national.
reunification. in. 1975. forced. Vietnam. to. undertake. economic.
reforms,.with.the.first.serious.reform.known.as.Doi.Moi.in.1986.
and. later. the.even.more.radical.market-oriented.reform.of.1989.
marked. a. turning. point. in. the. history. of. Vietnam’s. economic.
development.. After. some. initial. success,. complacency. built. up.
and.the.reform.process.in.general.slowed.down.during.the.period.
1996.-.99,.especially.after. the.Asian.Crisis..However,. since.2000.
there. have. been. renewed. commitments. to. reform,. with. some.
being. achieved. especially. in. the. development. of. private. sector.
and.trade. liberalization.1.During.the.years. immediately.after.the.
initiation.of.economic.reform,.the.focus.was.on.macroeconomic.
stabilization.and.price.liberalization..Several.measures.to.establish.
market. institutions. for. the. economy.were. introduced. including.
the.recognition.of.a.multi-sector.economy.and.property.rights...
1.	 The	privatization	process	has	been	accelerated	when	the	Government	allowed	
some	large	and	“monopoly”	firms	in	banking,	insurance,	petroleum,	and	tele-
communication	sectors	to	be	privatized	since	2006.
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Vietnam.has.substantially.liberalized.its.trade.and.investment.
policies.since.the.late.1980s..During.the.early.years.of.economic.
reform,. Vietnam. liberalized. its. trade. regime. through. signing.
trade.agreement.with.about.60.countries..It.has.also.implemented.
preferential.trade.agreement.with.the.European.Union.since.1992..
Later. on,. the. country. actively. sought. membership. of. regional.
and. global. organizations.1. Vietnam. has. become. a. member. of.
the.Association.of.Southeast.Asian.Nations.(ASEAN).since.June.
1995.and.the.Asia.Pacific.Economic.Co-operation.(APEC).since.
1998.. In. 2000,. Vietnam. signed. a. historic. comprehensive. trade.
agreement. with. the. USA. to. normalize. trade. relations. between.
the. two. countries.. Recently,. Vietnam. has. also. joined. regional.
integration. clubs. such. as. ASEAN-China. Free. Trade. Area. and.
ASEAN-Japan. Comprehensive. Economic. Partnership.. Most.
recently,.in.2007.Vietnam.became.the.latest.member.of.the.World.
Trade.Organization..
Since. its. 1989. reforms,. Vietnam. has. recorded. remarkable.
achievements. in. terms. of. GDP. growth,. macroeconomic.
stabilization,.export.expansion,.and.poverty.reduction..It.is.now.
generally.recognized.that.Vietnam.is.among.the.best.developing.
countries.in.terms.of.achieving.relatively.high.economic.growth.
and. reducing. poverty. incidence.. Over. the. period. 1990-2008,.
Vietnam’s.GDP.growth.rate.averaged.at.over.7.percent.per.year..
Today,.Vietnam’s.growth.rates.remain.among.the.highest.in.the.
region.(second.only.to.China)..Figure.4.1.shows.that.except.for.
the.first.two.years.(1990.and.1991).after.economic.reform.where.
the.GDP.growth.rate.was.around.5.percent,.from.1990.to.1997,.
the.GDP.growth.rate.stayed.at.around.8.percent.per.annum.on.
average..The. GDP. growth. rate,. however,. went. down. between.
2.	 International	 integration	processes	picked	up	 from	 the	early	1990s	 after	 the	
collapse	 of	 the	Berlin	wall	 and	Vietnam	 lost	 its	 traditional	markets	 in	East-
ern	Europe	and	Soviet	Union	in	the	late	1980s.	The	US	trade	embargo	against	
Vietnam	was	only	 lifted	 in	1994,	and	 the	 relationship	with	 the	US	was	nor-
malized	in	1995.	Another	important	achievement	and	event	is	that	since	1993,	
Vietnam	has	basically	opened	development	assistance	resources	(ODA)	which	
have	contributed	to	the	substantial	increase	of	financial	resources	for	Vietnam’s	
development	investment.
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1997.and.1999,.partly.because.of.the.Asian.financial.crisis,.and.
partly. because. of. the.dissipation.of. reform.effects.. Since. 2000,.
the.economy.has.regained.its.momentum,.growing.at.7.percent.
per.year,.reaching.8.5.percent.in.2007,.before.dropping.back.to.
an.estimated.6.2.percent.in.2008.due.to.the.impact.of.the.Global.
Financial. Crisis.. High. and. continuous. GDP. growth. rates. and.
successful.economic.development.over.the.period.has.resulted.in.
overall.improvement.of.people’s.welfare.and.significant.poverty.
reduction.. Successive. Household. Living. Standard. Surveys. of.
Vietnam. shows. total. poverty. incidence. to. have. declined. from.
58. percent. in. 1993. to. 37. percent. in. 1998,. 29. percent. in. 2002,.
19.5.percent.in.2004.and.16.percent.in.2006.(SRV,.2003;.Nguyen.
Viet. Cuong,. 2009).. Besides,. there. are. improvements. in. other.
dimension. of. people’s. welfare. such. as. the. high. percentage. of.
literate.adults.(over.90.percent),.higher.life.expectancy.(over.70.
years),.a.lower.under-five.mortality.rate.(40.per.1000.live.births.
in.2003)..
Figure 4.1: Macroeconomic Indicators: GDP Growth, Exports and FDI
Source: GSO
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As.a.result,.after.20.years.of.reform,.Vietnam.has.put.in.place.
the.fundamentals.of.a.market.economy.and.opened.up.the.economy.
to. international.flow.of. capital. and. trades. in. goods. and. services..
The. emergence. of. the. market-based. economy. with. appropriate.
institutions,. stable.macroeconomic. environment. and. the. support.
of.the.government.for.business.development.have.allowed.Vietnam.
to.(i).unlock.the.potential.of.the.agriculture.sector,.turning.Vietnam.
from.a.food-hunger.country.to.the.world.third.largest.rice.exporter;.
(ii).encourage.the.development.of.a.vibrant.domestic.private.sector;.
(iii). attract. a. large. amount.of. foreign. investment;. (iv). . realize. its.
comparative.advantages.and.gain.more.benefits.from.international.
trade..These.factors.underlie.the.economic.success.that.Vietnam.has.
achieved.since.the.early.1990s..
4.3.2 Vietnam’s Industrial Structure and Competitiveness
During. the. course. of. transition. to. a. market. economy,. the.
structure.of.the.economy.witnessed.gradual.changes.in.sectoral.and.
ownership.structure..As.tabulated.in.Table.4.2,.during.this.period,.
the.structure.of.the.economy.has.shifted.towards.industrialization.
and.modernization..The. proportion. of. agriculture,. forestry. and.
fishery.in.GDP.has.declined.from.27.4.percent.in.1994.and.20.3.
percent.in.2007..The.share.of.industry.and.construction.in.GDP.
has.risen.from.28.8.percent.in.1995.to.38.1.percent.in.2001.and.41.5.
percent. in.2007.. Importantly,. the. share.of. the.manufacturing.sub-
sector.within.the.industry.and.construction.sector.increased.from.15.
percent.in.1995.to.21.percent.in.2008..The.share.of.the.services.sector.
remains.between.30.percent.and.40.percent.in.recent.years..
Table 4.2:  GDP Structure by Economic Sector, 1990 – 2008 
(Current Prices)
1995 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
GDP  
(current prices) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Agriculture,  
Forestry  
& fishery
27.18 23.24 23.03 22.54 21.81 20.97 20.40 20.34 22.10
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Industry  
and  
Construction
28.76 38.13 38.49 39.47 40.21 41.02 41.54 41.48 39.73
Manufacturing 14.99 19.78 20.58 20.45 20.34 20.63 21.25 21.26 21.10
Services 44.06 38.63 38.48 37.99 37.98 38.01 38.06 38.18 38.17
Source: GSO statistical data, various years
Although. Vietnam. has. witnessed. significant. changes. in.
the. structure. of. the. economy,. it. is. important. to. investigate.
its. industrial. capacity. and. performance.. In. its. Industrial.
Development.Report.series,.UNIDO.publishes.the.competitive.
industrial. performance. (CIP). index. to. benchmark. industrial.
national. performance. in. the. global. economy.. In. order. to.
assess.the.overall.competitiveness.of.Vietnam.industrial.sector,.
following.the.UNIDO.methodology,.we.calculate.an.updated.CIP.
index.for.Vietnam.and.a.group.of.benchmarking.countries.for.
2008..The.composite.index.consists.of.both.trade.and.industry.
components.. Although. the. industry. component. is. important.
in.reflecting.the.capacity.of.the.industrial.sector,.it.is.the.trade.
component.that.will.reflect.the.competitiveness.of.the.industrial.
sector.. Instead.of.calculating. the. index. for.all. countries. in. the.
world,.in.this.section,.we.focus.only.on.a.number.of.countries..
The. benchmarking. countries. (comparators). are. selected. to.
reflect.the.various.groups.of.countries.that.are.comparables.to.
Vietnam.in.some.way,.namely.neighboring.countries,.potential.
competitors,.role.model.countries.and.large.scale.countries..As.
can.be.seen.in.Table.4.3,.Vietnam.ranks.16.out.of.17.countries..
The.ranking.positions.are.stable.over.time,.which.confirms.that.
industrial. competitiveness. is. a. path-dependent. process.where.
economic. transformation. takes. time..The.Table. indicates. that.
during. the. last. decade,.Vietnam.although.having. significantly.
developed.its.manufacturing.capacity,.was.not.able.to.improve.
its.ranking,.remaining.at.the.16th.place.out.of.17.countries.
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Table 4.3: Competitive Industrial Performance, Selected Countries
Economies
2000 2008
Trade.
Index
Industry.
Index
CIP Ranking
Trade.
Index
Industry.
Index
CIP Ranking
Brazil 0.2781 0.1416 0.2099 11 0.2344 0.1223 0.1784 12
Chile 0.0160 0.1110 0.0635 17 0.0147 0.1034 0.0590 17
China 0.3410 0.3730 0.3570 7 0.4279 0.4123 0.4201 4
Costa.Rica 0.3403 0.2141 0.2772 9 0.3357 0.1330 0.2343 9
India 0.2000 0.1226 0.1613 14 0.2544 0.0936 0.1740 14
Indonesia 0.1897 0.2568 0.2233 10 0.1353 0.2290 0.1822 11
Korea,.R. 0.5101 0.5500 0.5300 3 0.5477 0.6291 0.5884 2
Malaysia 0.4992 0.4902 0.4947 4 0.3338 0.3898 0.3618 6
Mexico 0.4488 0.2696 0.3592 6 0.4198 0.2790 0.3494 7
Morocco 0.1810 0.0659 0.1235 15 0.2177 0.0312 0.1244 15
Philippines 0.5009 0.1968 0.3488 8 0.4777 0.1988 0.3383 8
Singapore 0.9796 0.8983 0.9390 1 0.9226 0.8185 0.8705 1
South.Africa 0.2166 0.1314 0.1740 12 0.2660 0.0833 0.1746 13
Taiwan 0.5636 0.5609 0.5623 2 0.5371 0.4663 0.5017 3
Thailand 0.3739 0.3842 0.3790 5 0.3899 0.4075 0.3987 5
Tunisia 0.2390 0.0925 0.1658 13 0.2903 0.0763 0.1833 10
Vietnam 0.0291 0.1007 0.0649 16 0.1144 0.0904 0.1024 16
Sources: Calculations based on UN Comtrade data, World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, and Key Indicators
Although. the. composite. index. (Table. 4.3). gives. an. overall.
picture.of. competitiveness,. it. is. important. to. investigate.various.
aspects. of. the. industrial. competitiveness. for. Vietnam.. First,.
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manufacturing. value. added. (MVA). is. the. basic. indicator. for.
industrial. performance.. MVA. growth. in. Vietnam. over. the. last.
years.has.been.impressive.–.MVA.increases.2.4.times.in.only.eight.
years.from.US$5.8.billion.in.2000.to.US$14.0.in.2008.(see.Table.
4.4.below)..Only.MVA.growth.rates.in.China.is.comparable.to.that.
of.Vietnam.for.the.period..Although.the.growth.rate.of.Vietnam.
is. high,. Vietnam. started. from. a. very. low. base,. which. allowed.
Vietnam.to.grow.fast.during.the.last.decade..The.question.is.really.
whether.Vietnam.can.keep.up.such.impressive.growth.levels.as.its.
MVA.base.expands..Like. the.case.of.Cambodia,.Vietnam. is. fast.
growing.but. from.a. very. small.manufacturing.base,.which. calls.
for.caution.when.reading.growth.rates..Putting.this.in.perspective,.
Vietnam’s.MVA.base.is.still.half.of.that.of.the.Philippines,.and.more.
than.5.times.smaller.than.that.of.Thailand,.a.country.with.almost.
20.million.fewer.inhabitants.than.Vietnam..In.light.of.the.positive.
signs.of.industrial.progress,.it.is.important.to.note.that.Vietnam’s.
share.of.global.MVA.is.0.18.per.cent,.up.from.0.1.per.cent.in.2000..
If.we.adjust.for.the.size.of.the.economy,.then.it.is.even.clearer.that.
Vietnam. is. still. far.behind. the.best. industrial.performers. in. the.
region..Although.Vietnam’s.MVA.per.capita.tripled.between.2000.
and.2008,.this.has.not.affected.its.position.in.the.regional.MVA.per.
capita.ranking.where.it.is.barely.ahead.of.Cambodia.and.US$100.
behind.the.Philippines.(see.Table.4.4.below).
Table 4.4:  Manufacturing Value Added for Vietnam and Comparators, 
2000-2008
MVA.(.US$.billion.
constant.2000.prices) Global.MVA.share.(%) Annual.Growth.Rate.(%)
Economies 2000 2005 2008 2000 2005 2008 2000-05 2005-08 2000-08
Brazil 96,2 111,0 121,2 1,62 1,78 2,09 2,90 3,00 2,94
Chile 13,3 15,9 17,7 0,22 0,23 0,22 3,72 3,72 3,72
China 384,9 630,8 920,3 6,50 9,55 14,24 10,38 13,42 11,51
Costa.Rica 3,7 4,3 4,9 0,06 0,05 0,05 3,26 4,31 3,65
India 65,8 91,0 114,6 1,11 1,53 1,72 6,72 7,99 7,19
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Indonesia 45,8 58,4 66,2 0,77 1,02 1,37 4,98 4,30 4,72
Korea,.R. 134,6 184,4 220,1 2,27 2,71 2,25 6,51 6,08 6,35
Malaysia 28,9 36,3 40,6 0,49 0,53 0,49 4,63 3,79 4,31
Mexico 107,2 108,9 117,8 1,81 1,95 1,90 0,31 2,67 1,19
Morocco 5,7 6,8 7,7 0,10 0,11 0,11 3,46 4,29 3,77
Philippines 16,9 20,9 23,4 0,29 0,30 0,36 4,33 3,93 4,18
Singapore 23,9 29,3 33,4 0,40 0,40 0,34 4,22 4,36 4,28
South.Africa 22,9 26,3 30,2 0,39 0,52 0,41 2,75 4,82 3,52
Taiwan 76,3 95,1 111,4 1,29 1,08 0,82 4,50 5,41 4,84
Thailand 41,2 56,4 65,7 0,70 0,80 0,90 6,48 5,17 5,99
Tunisia 3,5 4,1 4,8 0,06 0,06 0,06 3,05 4,89 3,73
Vietnam 5,8 10,0 14,0 0,10 0,14 0,18 11,65 11,71 11,67
Sources: UNSTATS and World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(2000-2008).
Another.dimension.of.competitiveness.of.the.industrial.sector.
is.the.export.of.manufactured.goods..Table.4.5.shows.that.Vietnam.
is.among.the.highest.growth.countries.in.terms.of.annual.growth.
rate,.over.20.percent.per.year.during.the. last.decade..Exports.of.
manufactures.grew.at.23.59.percent.per.year.from.US$6.8.billion.
in.2000.to.US$36.94.billion.in.2008..This.impressive.rate.has.made.
Vietnam.the.country.with.the.second.highest.export.growth.rate.
in.the.world,.only.behind.China...In.spite.of.its.fast.growth.rates,.
Vietnam’s.manufactured.export.volume. is.quite. small. compared.
with.other.countries.in.the.study..Vietnam’s.export.share.accounts.
for.only.a.small.proportion.in.world.markets,.only.0.74.percent.of.
world.trade.for.manufactures.in.2008..In.terms.of.manufacturing.
capacity.in.relation.to.exports,.as.indicated.in.Table.4.6,.the.value.
of. manufactured. exports. per. capita. of. Vietnam. has. increased.
from.US$87.billion.in.2000.to.US$429.billion.in.2008..However,.
Vietnam.still.fares.poorly.compared.to.other.countries,.standing.
on.the.16th.place.out.of.17.countries.in.the.survey.sample.
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Table 4.5:  Manufactured Exports for Vietnam and Comparators, 
2000-2008
Value of 
manufactured 
exports (US$ billion)
World market share 
(%) Annual growth rate (%)
2000 2005 2008 2000 2005 2008 2000-2005
2005-
2008
2000-
2008
Brazil 45,79 88,54 137,71 0.92 ..1.78 ..2.77 14.14 15.86 14.79
Chile 8,80 19,81 33,10 0.18 ..0.40 ..0.67 17.61 18.67 18.01
China 228,84 722,85 1,369.3 4.61 14.55 27.56 25.86 23.73 25.06
Costa.Rica 4,02 5,38 7,31 0.08 ..0.11 ..0.15 ..6.03 10.73 ..7.77
Indonesia 42,61 54,68 82,82 0.86 ..1.10 ..1.67 ..5.11 14.84 ..8.66
India 35,45 87,12 157,45 0.71 ..1.75 ..3.17 19.70 21.81 20.49
Korea,.Rep. 166,94 277,86 409,86 3.36 ..5.59 ..8.25 10.73 13.83 11.88
Morocco 5,64 8,84 15,28 0.11 ..0.18 ..0.31 ..9.39 20.01 13.26
Mexico 143,94 174,62 229,44 2.90 ..3.51 ..4.62 ..3.94 ..9.53 ..6.00
Malaysia 87,322 119,87 139,70 1.76 ..2.41 ..2.81 ..6.54 ..5.23 ..6.05
Philippines 36,58 39,74 45,30 0.74 ..0.80 ..0.91 ..1.67 ..4.46 ..2.71
Singapore 130,06 216,46 306,94 2.62 ..4.36 ..6.18 10.73 12.35 11.33
Thailand 58,53 96,48 150,50 1.18 ..1.94 ..3.03 10.51 15.98 12.53
Tunisia 4,99 8,93 15,83 0.10 ..0.18 ..0.32 12.31 21.02 15.50
Taiwan 144,38 182,99 223,82 2.91 ..3.68 ..4.50 ..4.85 ..6.94 ..5.63
Vietnam 6,78 17,49 36,947 0.14% ..0.35 ..0.74 20.85 28.29 23.59
South.Africa 18,63 33,06 51,58 0.37% ..0.67 ..1.04 12.16 15.98 13.58
Source: UN Comtrade database.
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Table 4.6:  Manufactured Exports per capita for Vietnam and 
Comparators, US$, 2000-2008
Ranking
Country
Current US$ per capita
2008 2000 2008 2000
1 1 Singapore 63425 32290
2 3 Korea,.Rep. 8432 3551
3 2 Malaysia 5176 3752
4 7 Thailand 2234 939
5 4 Mexico 2157 1469
6 8 Chile 1976 571
7 5 Costa.Rica 1617 1024
8 9 Tunisia 1533 523
9 11 South.Africa 1059 423
10 15 China 1033 181
11 6 Taiwan 960 973
12 12 Brazil 717 262
13 10 Philippines 501 471
14 14 Morocco 489 198
15 16 Vietnam 429 87
16 13 Indonesia 363 207
17 17 India 138 35
Source: UN Comtrade database.
The.share.of.manufactured.exports.in.total.exports.shows.the.
industrial.structure.of.a.country..The.higher.the.share.of.a.country’s.
manufactured. exports. in. total. exports,. the. more. industrialized.
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that.country.becomes..Figure.4.2.shows.the.quick.industrializing.
process.in.Vietnam;.its.share.of.manufactured.exports.had.risen.
from.47.percent. in.2000. to.about.60.percent. in.2008..However,.
Vietnam. still. lags. behind. all. other. comparators,. except. Chile..
Although.decreasing.slightly,. the.share.of.manufactured.exports.
in.total.exports.of.other.regional.comparators.(except.Indonesia).
is.much.higher.than.Vietnam,.especially.the.Philippines.(above.92.
percent)..There.is.no.much.difference.between.Vietnam.and.other.
resource-based.countries.(in.this.group.and.for.all.comparators,.
Chile.is.the.bottom.country)..
Figure 4. 2: Share of Manufactured Exports in Total Exports, Selected 
Countries (Percent)
The. technology. content. of. Vietnam’s. exports. has. not. been.
discussed. so. far,. which. is. an. essential. element. of. industrial.
capacity. and. competitiveness.. In. order. to. analyze. the. evolution.
of.the.technology.content.of.Vietnam’s.manufactured.exports,.the.
technological.classification.of.UNCTAD.has.been.adopted,.which.
groups.traded.commodities.into.high-tech,.medium-tech,.low-tech.
and.resource-based..Table.4.7.shows.the.structure.of.manufactured.
export.of.Vietnam.and.comparators.in.2000.and.2008..
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From.Table.4.7,.it.is.clear.that.Vietnam.has.the.largest.share.of.
low-tech.products.in.manufactured.exports..From.2000.to.2008,.
low-tech.exports.are.still.above.65.percent.of.total.manufactured.
exports..The.shares.of.high-tech.and.resource-based.exports.also.
fell.slightly.while.that.of.medium-tech.exports.rose.from.10.percent.
in.2000.to.15.percent.in.2008..Overall,.Vietnam’s.export.structure.
in. 2008. is. still. rather. similar. to. that. in. 2000.. Given. structures.
are.difficult.to.change.because.they.reflect.slow.and.incremental.
learning. processes. that. result. from. resource. endowments,.
capabilities.and.technological.activity,.it.is.still.a.good.sign.that.the.
share.of.medium-tech.exports. is.gradually. increasing.while. that.
of.resource-based.exports.is.falling..The.actual.value.of.Vietnam’s.
manufactured.exports.also.confirms.this..The.value.of.medium-tech.
exports.in.2008.increased.more.than.8.times.in.comparison.with.
that.of.year.2000..High-tech.and.low-tech.exports.increased.more.
slowly,.about.5.times,.while.resource.based.exports.increased.less.
than.5.times..In.fact,.Vietnam.is.one.of.three.countries,.the.others.
being.China.and.India,.that.had.dramatic.increases.of.actual.value.
for.manufactured.exports..Tunisia.also.had.impressive.increase.of.
high.and.medium.tech,.in.terms.of.actual.value.
Table 4.7:  Technological Structure of Manufactured Exports, 2000 and 
2008 (Percent)
Country
2000 2008
HT MT LT RB HT MT LT RB
Vietnam 11 10 65 14 10 15 67 8
China 21 24 45 9 30 28 33 9
India 5 13 47 34 8 20 27 45
Brazil 15 33 17 35 10 37 11 43
Chile 1 13 6 80 1 10 3 86
South Africa 5 35 17 43 4 47 11 38
Indonesia 15 20 32 34 6 23 23 48
229
Malaysia 55 21 10 14 34 24 13 29
Philippines 69 12 12 7 62 16 8 14
Thailand 32 27 22 19 23 38 16 24
Korea 35 35 18 12 28 44 12 16
Singapore 59 21 7 13 45 22 7 27
Taiwan 43 28 24 4 36 32 19 13
Costa Rica 47 20 19 14 36 25 19 21
Mexico 24 52 18 6 19 58 13 10
Morocco 10 13 50 27 6 26 30 38
Tunisia 3 22 58 17 5 34 39 22
Source: UN Comtrade database.
Figure.4.3.presents.the.world’s.manufactured.export.structure.and.
that.of.Vietnam.during. the.period.2000-2008.. It. is. important. to.note.
that.the.export.structures.in.both.graphs.do.not.vary.much.within.these.
years;.thus,.aligning.the.export.structure.of.Vietnam.to.that.of.the.world.
will. surely. be. a. time-consuming. and.difficult. process..Another. point.
worth.noticing.is.the.rapid.rise.of.the.world’s.resource-based.exports..
Until. 2003,. this. product. group. still. had. the. lowest. share. among. the.
four. in. the. world’s. export. structure.. However,. it. has. surpassed. low-
tech.exports.in.2004.and.later.high-tech.exports.in.2008.to.become.the.
second.most-demanded.product.group.globally...On.the.Vietnam.side,.
the.notable.change.in.export.structure.occurred.in.2006.when.medium-
tech.exports.exceeded.resource-based.exports.to.have.the.second.highest.
share.among.the.four.groups.
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Figure 4.4:  Manufactured Export Structure, Vietnam and World, 
2000-2008
 
 
Source: UN Comtrade
 
 
Source: UN Comtrade
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4.3.3 Vietnam’s Industrialization Policy
It.has.been.widely. commented. that. even.after.nearly. two.
decades.of.reforms,.many.of.the.interventionist.policies.of.the.
old.command.system.have.not.been. totally.dismantled. in. the.
country..Vietnam’s. industrial. policymakers. remain. stuck. to. a.
significant.degree.in.strategies.based.on.import.substitution.and.
continued.state.dominance.of.all.but.the.peripheral.small.firms.
and.those.controlled.or.managed.by.foreign.investors.(Perkin.
2001)..Vietnam’s.Socio-economic.Development.Strategy.for.the.
period. 2001-2010. has. set. the. target. for. Vietnam. to. “become.
an. industrialized. and. modern. country. by. 2020”.. To. achieve.
this. target,. specific.measures.were. spelt. out;. amongst. which,.
state. sector. reform. and. development. of. import-substituting.
industries. continues. to. be. of. high. priority.. According. to. the.
2001-2010. strategy,. “the. leading. role. of. the. State. economic.
sector. is. to. be. enhanced,. governing. key. domains. of. the.
economy;. State. enterprises. are. to. be. renewed. and.developed,.
ensuring. production. and. business. efficiency”.. It. also. puts. a.
clear.emphasis.on.the.“rapid.development.of.industries.which.
can. make. the. best. use. of. Vietnam’s. competitive. advantages,.
control.the.domestic.markets.and.push.up.exports”,.as.well.as.
“selective.construction.of.some.heavy-industry.manufacturing.
units”.. In. this. section,.we. review. the.development.of. relevant.
industrial. policy. to. assess. if. such. policy. could. deliver. the.
expected.outcomes.as.envisioned.above.
Trade Policy
Trade.policy. is.one.of. the.most.often.used. instruments. to.
implement.industrial.policies..However,.the.policy.formulation.
and.implementation.of.trade.policies.of.Vietnam.seem.to.serve.
other.objectives.besides.industrial.development..Before.joining.
the.WTO.in.2007,.Vietnam’s.trade.policy.can.be.described.as.a.
mixture.of.import-substitution.and.export.promotion..Products.
and.sectors.that.were.protected.include.the.agricultural.sector,.
some. labor-intensive. products. such. as. textiles,. garments,.
furniture. and. some. technology-intensive. products. such. as.
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automobiles..Maximum. tariff. levels.were. imposed.on. alcohol,.
petroleum.products,.automobiles,.motorcycles,.cosmetics,.glass,.
and.glass.products.1.Low.or.minimum.tariff.rates.were.levied.on.
raw.material.inputs,.machinery,.and.equipment;.especially.those.
not.manufactured.by.Vietnam..Products. like. sugar,.petroleum.
products,. cement. and. clinker,. some. common. chemicals,.
chemical.fertilizer,.paint,.tubes.and.tires,.paper,.silk,.construction.
ceramic,. construction. glass,. construction. steel,. some. types. of.
engines,.automobiles,.motorcycles,.bicycles.and.parts,.and.ships.
and.vessels.were.subject.to.quantitative.restrictions.on.imports..
The. prevalence. of. and. inconsistent. application. of. protection.
followed.by.Vietnam.has.led.Athukorala.(2006).to.conclude.that.
“Vietnam. has. a. tendency. to. protect. any. industrial. sector. but.
do.not.have.the.focused.protection.policy.for.the.sectors.which.
most.influence.the.economy”.
Figure 4.5: Vietnam’s Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection, 
2005 – 2009
               Whole economy           Manufacturing sector
Source: Adapted from Trinh (2010).
1.	 It	 should	 also	 be	 noted	 that	 import	 tax	 collection	 is	 still	 a	major	 source	 of	
revenue	 for	 the	 government.	 This	 in	 part	 will	 limit	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	
industrial	policy.	There	are,	however,	unintended	effects	of	 such	policies	on	
economic	efficiency	and	consumer	welfare,	which	need	to	be	balanced.	High	
tariffs,	import	restrictions	and	non-tariff	barriers	against	imports	are	intended	
to	protect	domestic	producers	of	similar	products.	But	protection	is	also	a	form	
of	subsidy	whose	costs	are	borne	by	domestic	consumers.	When	protection	is	
given	 to	 industrial	goods,	 for	example	 steel,	 cement,	or	plastics,	 the	price	 is	
paid	by	other	downstream	producers,	which	makes	protection	self-defeating.		
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Vietnam. is. now. committed. to. creating. a. more. open. and.
competitive. economy. through. implementation. of. the. AFTA.
agreements,. the.US-Vietnam. Bilateral. Trade. Agreement. (BTA)..
Most.recently,.the.WTO.accession.in.2007.has.changed.the.rules.
for.industrial.policy..Protection.will.no.longer.be.easily.available.
for.Vietnam’s.enterprises,.and.their.products.will.have.to.compete.
with. more. competitive. imported. products.. Trade. policy. may.
no. longer. be. an. instrument. of. broader. industrial. development.
strategies. and. any. discrimination. against. imported. products. or.
foreign.producers.can.trigger.sanctions.by.other.countries.against.
Vietnam..The. commitments. of.Vietnam. under. various. bilateral.
and.multilateral.arrangements.and.agreements.have.led.to.serious.
reduction.in.the.effective.rate.of.protection.for.Vietnam..In.a.recent.
study,.Bui.Trinh.(2010).has.shown.that.both.nominal.and.effective.
rate.of.protection.for.Vietnam.in.general.and.the.industrial.sector.
in.particular.has.dropped.significantly..In.summary,.trade.policy.
can.make. little.contribution. to. the. implementation.of. industrial.
policy.of.Vietnam..This.is.partly.due.to.the.global.trend.in.reducing.
trade. barriers. but. also. due. to. the. poor. co-ordination. between.
policies.and.agencies.
Policy towards the Business Sector
An.important.structural.shift,.reflecting.the.important.shift.in.
economic.policy,.is.the.change.in.the.ownership.structure.of.the.
economy..The.shift. in. the.GDP.structure. in. terms.of.ownership.
remains. slow. as. reflected.by. the. relatively. stable. and. significant.
share.in.GDP.by.the.state-owned.sector,.partly.because.of.the.slow.
progress.of.the.SOE.equitization.program..Table.4.8.shows.that.the.
share.of.the.state-own.sector.has.decreased.from.over.40.percent.
in.1995. to.34.percent. in.2008..The.FDI. sector.has.continuously.
increased. its. share. from. 6.3. percent. in. 1995. to. 18.6. percent. in.
2008,.demonstrating.its.greater.role.as.the.economy.integrates.into.
the.world.economy..The.private.sector.has.also.increased.its.role,.
accounting. for. nearly. 10. percent. of. the. economy..The. business.
sector. remains. an. important. sector. of. the. economy,. accounting.
for.30.percent.of.GDP..
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Table 4.8:  GDP Share and Growth Rate by Ownership, 1995 – 2008 
(Percent)
1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
GDP (Current prices) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
State sector 40.18 38.52 38.40 38.38 39.08 39.10 38.40 37.39 35.93 34.35
Non-state sector 53.51 48.20 47.84 47.86 46.45 45.76 45.61 45.63 46.12 46.97
Collective sector 10.06 8.58 8.06 7.99 7.49 7.09 6.82 6.53 6.21 6.02
Private sector 7.44 7.31 7.95 8.30 8.23 8.49 8.89 9.41 10.19 10.81
Household sector 36.02 32.31 31.84 31.57 30.73 30.19 29.91 29.69 29.72 30.14
Foreign invested 
sector
6.30 13.27 13.76 13.76 14.47 15.13 15.99 16.98 17.96 18.68
Source: GSO and calculations by authors.
The. emergence. of. the. private. enterprise. sector. since. the.
reforms. is. an. important. development.. The. 1990s. also. saw. the.
emergence.of.the.private.sector,.thanks.to.first.the.introduction.of.
the.company.law.and.private.enterprise.law.in.1991.(later.amended.
in.1994)..These. two. laws. together.with. the.adoption.of. the.new.
land.law.in.1993.and.the.labor.code.in.1994.provided.an.important.
stimulus.for.the.development.of.the.private.sector..However,.the.
most.significant.reform.in.the.development.of.the.private.business.
sector.came.in.2000.with.the.new.Enterprises.law..During.2000-
2004,.about.90,000.private.enterprises.were.registered.under.the.
new.Law,.(doubling.the.number.of.companies.registered.during.the.
9.years.of.the.two.previous.laws).with.the.total.capital.equivalent.
to.about.US$13.billion..This.sector.is.making.rapid.gains.in.terms.
of.both.its.contribution.to.output.growth.and.its.growing.freedom.
from.the.restrictions.placed.on.it.under.central.planning.1.
1.		 Some	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 the	 private	 sector	may	not	 be	 quite	 as	 healthy	
and	robust	as	the	numbers	imply.	See	the	paper	by	IFC	“Beyond	the	Headline	
Numbers:	Business	Registration	and	Startup	in	Vietnam”.	http://www.ifc.org/
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The.government.continued. its. import-substitution.policy. to.
protect.those.SOEs,.which.are.mostly.capital-intensive:.producing.
steel,.motorcycle,. and. industrial. equipment.. Investment. poured.
into.this.sector,. instead.of.moving.toward.developing.a.stronger.
private.sector..The.most.important.incentive.is.the.perception.that.
SOEs.will.not.be.allowed.to.fail..SOEs.are.protected.by.a.variety.
of.methods,.including.tariffs.and.non-tariff.barriers,.which.shield.
them.from.import.protection..The.strong.government.commitment.
to. the. survival. of. SOEs,. together. with. the. SOEs’. alliances. with.
powerful.ministries,.forms.a.potent.shield.that.protects.the.SOEs.
against. competitive.market. forces..Rhetoric.about.private. sector.
development. notwithstanding,. a. level. playing. field. for. all. is. yet.
to.be.firmly.established.in.Vietnam’s.economy...However,.despite.
having. gone. through. many. rounds. of. reforms. and. receiving.
numerous.incentives.from.the.State,.the.SOEs.in.Vietnam.remain.
a.pampered,.yet.less.competitive.sector.of.the.economy..
The. Law. on. FDI. was. first. promulgated. in. 1987. and. later.
amended.in.1990,.1992,.1996.and.2000..This.law.helped.Vietnam.
to.attract.a.large.volume.of.foreign.capital.when.domestic.savings.
were.not.enough.to.meet. investment.needs..In.1987,. the.private.
sector.virtually.did.not.exist.in.Vietnam..By.allowing.foreign.direct.
investment,. Vietnam. in. effect. imported/implanted. the. private.
sector.for.the.first.time.after.the.unification.of.the.country..Since.
then,.FDI.has.indeed.become.an.integrated.part.of.the.Vietnamese.
economy.and.an.important.factor.in.Vietnam’s.economic.growth.
during. the. 1990s.. In. order. to. create. a. more. level. playing. field.
and.to.ensure.that.its.laws.allowed.for.national.treatment.for.FDI.
enterprises.prior.to.Vietnam’s.2006.accession.to.the.World.Trade.
Organization,. Vietnam. promulgated,. in. 2006,. two. important.
laws,. the.Investment.Law.and.the.new.Enterprise.Law,1.creating.
ifcext/mekongpsdf.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/PSDP-20/$FILE/PSDP-No-20-
EN.pdf	
1.	 Specifically,	 on	November	29,	 2005,	 the	National	Assembly	of	Vietnam	ad-
opted	the	Law	on	Investment	No.	59/2005/QH11	(“New	LOI”)	and	Law	on	
Enterprises	No.	60/2005/QH11	(“New	LOE”)	which	applies	to	all	enterprises	
established	by	domestic	and/or	foreign	investors.
236
a.corporate.law.regime.that.applies.to.both.foreign.and.domestic.
enterprises.1
In.2006,.of. the. three. economic. sectors,. the. state. sector.was.
still.the.most.important.source.of.investment.in.the.country..State.
investment. is.made. either. directly. into. public. infrastructure. or.
through.loans.to.SOEs,.or.in.the.form.of.grants.to.municipalities.
and. private. enterprises.. But. the. state’s. share. in. investment. has.
declined.from.60.percent.in.2001,.to.29.percent.in.2008.as.private.
domestic. investment. increases. and. the. inflow. of. foreign. direct.
investment.(FDI).increases..The.recent.decline.in.the.state’s.share.is.
due.more.to.the.increased.private.investment.than.to.new.inflows.
of. foreign. investment..The.domestic.non-state.sector.recorded.a.
continuous. upward. trend. as. a. significant. source. of. investment..
Private.sector.investment.has.increased.from.27.6.percent.in.1995.
to. 40. percent. by. 2008.2. Both. continued.with. state. involvement,.
and.increased.savings.and.investments.by.Vietnam’s.private.sector.
have.contributed.to.continuing.high.rates.of.economic.growth..
During. the. 1990s. and. early. 2000s,. FDI’s. share. of. total.
investment.declined.somewhat..FDI.accounted.for.30.percent.of.
investment. in. the.mid-1990s,.but. fell. to.20.percent. in. the.wake.
of.the.Asian.Financial.Crisis..Since.then,.the.share.of.FDI.in.total.
investment.kept. falling.until.2006..Very. recently,.new. large.FDI.
inflows.have.been.recorded,.in.part.as.a.result.of.reforms.committed.
to. as. part. of.WTO. accession. that. relaxed. rules. restricting. FDI.
and. hence. making. Vietnam. a. more. attractive. FDI. destination..
In. 2007. and. 2008,. FDI. became. the. most. important. source. of.
1.	 Besides	FDI,	Vietnam	also	started	to	receive	ODA	from	international	donors	
since	1993	and	the	amount	committed	and	disbursed	has	been	increasing	since	
then.	These	 capital	 sources	 contributed	 to	 infrastructural	 construction	 such	
as	transport	and	communication,	information,	agricultural	and	rural	develop-
ment,	public	health,	education	and	training,	administrative	reform,	legislation,	
and	structural	reform.
2.	 Jensen	and	Tarp	(2006)	point	out	that	private	savings	to	fund	private	sector	
investment	 comes	 as	much	 from	 retained	 earnings	 of	 firms	 as	 from	 savings	
by	households.	Reinvestment	of	corporate	profits	appears	to	be	an	important	
mechanism	to	maintain	high	rates	of	investment	and	growth.		
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investment..The.sudden.increases.in.the.share.of.FDI.during.2007-
2008.can.be.partly.explained.by.the.WTO.accession.of.Vietnam.
which. created. expectations. among. international. investors. about.
the. good. prospects. of. Vietnam.1. Although. Vietnam. has. been.
successful.in.attracting.FDI.in.recent.years,.the.real.benefits.from.
FDI. still. seem. controversial.. Previous. studies. have. found. little.
evidence. of. technical. spillover. from. FDI-related. enterprises. to.
local.counterparts.(Nguyen.et.al.,.2008)..In.addition,.the.country.
has.become.heavily.dependent.on.FDI.as.an.important.source.of.
input.to.sustain.economic.growth...
Sectoral Interventionist Policies
The. economic. reform. implemented. by. Vietnam. has.
created.a. large.and. increasingly. important.non-state. sector..The.
economic. reform. to. transform. its. economy. from. a. command.
economy.to.a.market-based.economy. is.characterized.by. its.use.
of. market-creating. measures.. However,. since. the. inception. of.
economic.reform,.Vietnam.has.also.attempted.a.number.of.active.
interventionist. policies. toward. selected. industries.. . Examples.
include. preferential. treatment. (i.e.. tax. holiday,. reduced. land.
rent.etc.).toward.FDI.in.some.sectors.which.later.have.also.been.
extended. to. the. domestic. private. sectors. (i.e.. industrial. zones)..
However,.the.results.are.mixed..For.the.motor.bike.industry,.the.
government.has.been.successful.with.its.policy.of.imposing.local.
content.and. the.motor.bike. sector.of.Vietnam.has.been.gaining.
some.regional.prominence..The.success.of.the.industry.is.in.large.
part. due. to. Vietnam’s. large. domestic. market.. However,. for. the.
automobile. sector,. it. can. be. characterized. as. a. failed. industrial.
policy.attempt..Given.its.small.domestic.market,.the.government.
granted. investment. licenses. to11. car-makers.. As. a. result,. the.
local. content.policy. for. the.automobile.companies.has.not.been.
successful.......
Other Policies: Education, Innovation, Science and Technology  
1.	 Vietnam	requires	 registration	of	 intended	FDI,	and	not	all	of	 those	 registra-
tions	are	implemented.
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Industrial.policy.and.trade.policy.are.not.stand-alone.policies.
(Valila,. 2009).. They. have. to. interact. with. other. policies. being.
formulated.and.implemented..How.do.these.policies.interact.with.
each.other.and.how.do.they.influence.the.possibility.of.attaining.
industrial.policy.objectives?.For.industrialization.to.be.realized,.at.
least.two.other.policies,.namely;.education.policy.and.Science.and.
Technology.(S&T).policy.have.to.play.important.roles..Although.
there.has.been.great.improvement.during.the.last.10.years,.the.S&T.
and.education.policies.have.not.yet.contributed.adequately.to.the.
success.of.Vietnam’s.industrial.policy..In.order.for.industrial.policy.
to.be.successful.and.for.the.industrial.base.to.develop.to.the.point.
that.it.can.be.self-sustained,.Vietnam.needs.to.have.good.domestic.
capacity.to.develop.the.industrial.base..However,.the.investment.
by.the.country.into.R&D,.innovation.and.higher.education.does.
not.seem.to.complement.other.interventionist.industrial.policies.
and. support. the. development. of. the. industrial. base.. Although.
Vietnam.has.spent.2.percent.of.its.state.spending.on.science.and.
technology.equivalent.to.0.5percent.of.GDP.since.2001,.in.absolute.
amount. the.figure. is.modest.as.compared. to.other.countries.. In.
particular,. investment. in.R&D.was.nearly. $400.million. in. 2007.
only.1.The.non-state.sector.invests.around.another.0.1.percent.of.
GDP.in.S&T.thus.increasing.national.investment.in.S&T.to.a.total.
of.0.6.percent.of.GDP..To.put.these.figures.in.perspective,.the.EU.
invests. 1.95. percent. of. its.GDP,. Japan. 3.15. percent,. China. 1.31.
percent,.the.US.2.59.percent,.and.South.Korea.nearly.5.percent..In.
terms.of.capacity,.Vietnam.invests.around.US$5.(2007).per.capita.
while.China.invests.US$20.in.2004.and.South.Korea.US$1,000.in.
2007..In.addition,.this.tiny.amount.of.S&T.investment.is.spread.
thinly.among.central.and.local.government.agencies..This.would.
in. turn. render. the. S&T. and. innovation. policies. ineffective.. To.
increase. the. investment. for. S&T. activities,. the. government. is.
looking.to.the.private.sector.with.the.hope.that.the.ratio.of.public.
to.private.investment.in.R&D.would.be.1:2.by.2010..However,.due.
to. its. public. nature. and. risks. associated.with. S&T. policies. and.
investment,.it.would.be.difficult.to.achieve.this.target..
1.	 	http://english.vietnamnet.vn/reports/2008/11/811926/			
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Table 4.9:  Composition of Graduates from Vietnam’s Higher Education 
System
Year 2005 2007 2008
Graduates.in.general.programmes.(%)  2.99  3.36  3.60
Graduates.in.education.(%) 34.18 37.22 33.22
Graduates.in.humanities.and.arts.(%)  4.34  3.22  3.93
Graduates.in.social.sciences,.business.and.
law.(%)
29.71 27.64 27.29
Graduates.in.science.(%)   0.00   0.00   0.00
Graduates.in.engineering,.manufacturing.
and.construction.(%)
21.25 20.46 19.76
Graduates.in.agriculture.(%)  4.78   4.86   5.02
Graduates.in.health.and.welfare.  2.74   3.24   3.19
Graduates.in.services..  0.00   0.00   3.99
Total.graduates.in.all.programmes. 100 100 100
Source: UNESCO
Table. 4.9. shows. the. structure. of. Vietnam’s. recent. higher.
education.graduates..As.can.be.seen,.the.number.of.graduates.in.
engineering.accounts.only.for.20.percent.of.total.graduates,.which.
is.much.lower.when.reference.is.made.to.the.remarkable.number.
of.graduates. in.Singapore.when.the.country.was. industrializing..
A. large. number. of. graduates. are. from. the. social. sciences. and.
business.studies..This.structure.to.some.extent.reflects.the.current.
incentives/enumeration.between.sectors.of.the.economy..As.such.
the.structure.does.not.seem.to.fit.with.the.purpose.of.promoting.
and.developing.the.industrial.base.for.the.country.
4.3.4 Lessons from the East Asian Policy Experience
The. experience. of. high. and. equitable. growth. in. East. Asia.
has. been. the. topic. of. extensive. research. during. the. last. few.
decades..One.of.the.most.hotly.debated.questions.in.the.economic.
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literature. is. the.exact.nature.of.government. intervention. in.East.
Asia..Following.the.influential.World.Bank.report.The.East.Asian.
Miracle.in.1993,.there.has.been.general.agreement.that.governments.
intervened. extensively. in.most. East. Asian. economies,. with. the.
exception.of.Hong.Kong..Still,.heated.debate.exists.over.the.exact.
nature.of. the.contribution.of. industrial.policy. to.growth. in.East.
Asia.and.the.desirability.of.following.similar.policies.particularly.
in.developing.countries..The.goal.in.this.section.is.to.make.sense.
of.what.is.relevant.to.the.current.challenges.faced.by.Vietnam.in.
light.of.the.East.Asian.experience,.and.to.evaluate.if.and.which.of.
the.industrial.policies.should.be.recommended.
The. economic. literature. points. out. that. the. experience. of.
the.East.Asian.is.very.diverse..The.selection.and.implementation.
of.policies.varied.enormously.and.was.highly.dependent.of.the.
conditions. facing. each. country.. However,. there. is. a. general.
consensus. about. the. ability. of. the.most. successful. East.Asian.
countries.to.get.the.fundamentals.right..In.particular,.the.World.
Bank’s. East. Asian. Miracle. report. in. 1993. acknowledged. the.
important.role.played.by.governments.in.Japan,.Korea,.Taiwan.
and.other.Asian.economies,.not.only.by.getting.the.fundamentals.
right,.but.also.through.active.interventions.to.promote.exports.
and.encourage.savings.and.investment..With.some.exceptions,.
they. enjoyed.macroeconomic. stability,. promoted. education. at.
all.levels,.invested.heavily.in.infrastructure,.and.possessed.good.
institutions. and. civil. services. committed. to.development,. and.
oriented.toward.export.sectors..Indeed,.government.intervention.
played. an. important. role. in. mobilizing. savings,. promoting.
exports. or. creating. a. skilled. workforce..The. political. context.
made. it. possible. for. governments. to. play. such. an. extensive.
role,.while.keeping.pressure.on.them.to.focus.on.development.
and. thus. build. legitimacy.. Efforts. to. promote. industrial.
sectors,. without. having. the. fundamentals. in. place. have. been.
unsuccessful. (for. example,. in. the. Philippines).. Governments.
intervened.extensively,.but.in.a.“market.friendly”.way,.avoiding.
major. distortions.. However,. it. is. hard. to. find. conclusive.
evidence. that. the.promotion.of. specific. sectors. contributed. to.
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growth..The.World.Bank.report.and.other.studies.did.not.find.
a.direct.link.between.selective.promotion.of.individual.sectors.
and. productivity-based. growth.1.With. a. few. exceptions,. there.
is.no.clear.evidence.that.selective.promotion.of.specific.was.the.
main. driver. for. growth. in. East.Asia..Where. selective. policies.
worked,. governments. attached. discipline. to. the. incentives. in.
order. to.monitor.performance.and.retired. support. to.firms. to.
firms.that.did.not.meet.the.goals.–.something.that.was.lacking.
in. the. Latin. American. development. experience.. Also,. East.
Asian.governments.showed.pragmatism.and.modified.policies,.
compared.to.other.countries.where.the.direct.public.support.to.
firms.has.been.more.persistent.and.difficult.to.dismantle.
Policies. have. also. evolved. over. time,. as. the. domestic.
and. international. context. changed.. There. are. a. number. of.
notable.developments.recently..First,.East.Asian.countries.have.
interestingly. liberalized. their. economies,. lowered. their. trade.
barriers,.and.changed.their.regulations.to.promote.competition.
and.a.more.efficient.use.of.resources..Currently,.governments.are.
more.focused.on.creating.a.good.investment.climate.for.private.
firms.. Secondly,. the. paradigm. of. industrial. policy. has. also.
evolved..The.emphasis.is.less.on.direct.government.selection.of.
promising.sectors,.and.more.on.the.use.of.indirect.mechanisms.
to. promote. technological. upgrading,. by. means. of. attracting.
FDI.and.developing.local.technological.capabilities..Third,.the.
world’s.production.and.trade.patterns.have.changed..As.global.
1.	 It	should	be	noted	that	East	Asia	was	not	the	only	region	in	which	governments	
intervened	with	the	goal	of	promoting	 industrialization	and	growth.	In	20th	
century,	Latin	America	and	in	some	countries	such	as	Brazil	at	the	end	of	the	
70s	pursued	a	similar	strategy.	However,	as	the	pace	of	technological	change	
accelerated	 Latin	 American	 countries	 were	 not	 able	 to	 adapt	 fast	 enough.	
Several	 reasons	 exists	 to	 explain	 the	 difference	 between	 Latin	 America	
and	 East	 Asia:	 poor	 macroeconomic	 management,	 falling	 investment	 in	
education	at	all	levels,	technology	policies	that	failed	to	create	incentives	in	firms	to	
innovate,	and	the	lack	of	discipline	in	government	support	to	firms.	The	East	Asian	
Miracle	ultimately	recommended	the	path	followed	by	Thailand,	Malaysia	and	
Indonesia	 that	 relied	more	on	FDI	 and	 less	on	directed	 credit,	 as	 a	 suitable	
model	for	developing	countries.
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integration.increases.it.becomes.more.difficult.for.governments.
to.predict.the.best.sectors.of.an.economy.for.which.a.country.
can.produce.with.relative.advantage..As.an.example,.the.initial.
success.of.the.software.industry.in.India.was.facilitated.in.part.
by. the. easing. of. government. intervention.. New. production.
patterns.put.governments.willing.to.promote.individual.sectors.
in.a.difficult.position..This.is.true.even.for.sectors.with.simpler.
technologies,. such. as. apparel,. as. production. chains. become.
increasingly. dispersed. and. the.most. labor-intensive. tasks. are.
rapidly. relocated. based. on. trade. preferences.. The. fast-paced.
technological. change. and. knowledge. flows. around. the.world.
also. present. advantages. and. disadvantages. for. developing.
countries..Countries.can.gain.better.access.to.technologies,.but.
they.also.have.to.compete.with.each.other.for.access.to.markets,.
technologies.and.investment..
In. order. to. assist. policy.makers. and. researchers. to. assess.
Vietnam’s. current. industrial. policy. in. comparison. with.
policies. adopted. by. other. East. Asian. countries. during. their.
implementation. of. industrial. policies,. we. compile. various.
industrial.policy.measures.and.compare.them.in.Table.4.10..As.
can.be.seen,.although.there.are.some.selective.industrial.policies,.
Vietnam.does.not.seem.to.have.a.coherent.set.of.policy.to.develop.
the.industrial.sector..
Table 4.10: Comparing Vietnam’s Industrial Policy with East Asian 
Miracle Countries
.......East.Asia.Miracle.Countries Vietnam.
Fundamental.Characteristics.and.
Policies.
.High.investment.rates/.high.
saving.and.investment.rates High.investment.but.low.saving
Responsible.tax.and.expenditure.
policies.–.no.large.deficits.
leading.to.inflation.
Large.budget.deficit.and.current.
account.deficit
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Stable.macroeconomic.
environment/.Macroeconomic.
stability.-.Free.from.high.
inflation.or.major.economic.
slumps
Bumpy.economic.development.
–.inflation.and.slump.in.the.last.
few.years
Realistic.exchange.rate.policy.to.
ensure.that.it.was.profitable.to.
export
Fixed.and.unrealistic.exchange.
rate.for.promoting.export
Limited.price.distortions. Price.control.on.some.commodities
Agricultural.development.
Promotes.agricultural.
development,.but.requires.
significant.improvement
High.share.of.trade.in.GDP Similar
Stable.and.secure.financial.
systems.
Developed.financial.system.is.yet.
to.be.developed
Improved.education/.high.
investments.in.human.capital.
Not.really.–.big.problem.in.
higher.education.and.vocational.
training.system
Policies.to.obtain.maximum.
benefit.from..investment.and.
education
Unclear
Openness.to.foreign.technology.
/encouragement.of.technological.
borrowing.-.technology.licensing.
-.Japan,.Korea,.Taiwan.(China)
Mixed.
Emphasis.on.exporting.which.
provided.a.spur.to.productivity.
enhancing.efforts.including:
Similar
Direct.Foreign.Investment.–.
Singapore.–.model.for.Special.
Economic.Zones.in.China.
Limited.evidence.of.spillover.
effects
Distorted.model.of.economic.
zones.into.industrial.zones.in.
Vietnam.(Vo.Dai.Luoc)
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Imports.of.equipment.and.
intermediates...embodying.new.
technology
Similar,.but.luxury.consumption.
imports
Knowledge.transfers.from.
purchasers.of.exports Similar,.but.limited
       Specific.Policies
Mild.financial.repression Absent
Export-push.trade.policies.
Available,.but.liberalized.to.fast.
and.limited.domestic.market.
protection.
Selective.industrial.promotion YES.-.but.….
Directed.credit Available,.but.to.the.benefit.of.SOEs
Complied by authors
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PART II – LARGE ECONOMIC GROUPS
4.4  Large Economic Groups and Industrial Policy
A.long-time.industrial.policy.objective.in.Vietnam.has.been.
to.build.up. internationally. competitive. conglomerates. (i.e.. large.
corporations.and.large.economic.groups).to.be.the.flag-carriers/
national. champions. of. the. Vietnam’s. economy.1. In. Vietnam,.
economic. and. business. groups. come. in. all. forms. and. types,.
including. state-owned. and. private. ones..The. questions. relating.
to. large.economic.groups,.especially. the.state-owned.groups.are.
drawing.increasing.attention.after.the.near-collapse.of.one.of.the.
biggest. state-owned. economic. groups. in. Vietnam. –. Vinashin,.
the.biggest.shipbuilder.and.a.large.economic.group..This.section.
investigates. whether. large. economic. groups,. especially. state-
owned.large.economic.groups.could.be.used.as.an.effective.tool.to.
implement.industrial.policy.for.national.economic.development..
This. is.because. if.Vietnam.is.willing. to. let. the.market. to.run. its.
course,.it.may.take.too.long.for.the.industrial.base.to.develop.and.
catch. up. with. other. countries..Thus,. large. economic. groups. in.
general.and.large.SOEs.may.be.used.in.a.strategic.sense.to.meet.a.
strategic.target...
Traditionally. in. economic. literature,. business. groups. are.
generally. considered. economically. inefficient.. However,. recent.
research. has. provided. a. new. understanding. of. the. importance.
1.	 ‘Large	Economic	Group’	is	a	word	for	word	translation	from	Vietnamese	into	
English.	 In	 the	 literature,	 this	 form	 of	 organization	 is	 commonly	 known	 as	
business	group.	In	this	chapter,	large	economic	group	and	business	group	are	
used	interchangeably.	In	1994,	the	Prime	Minister	issued	Decision	90/TTg	and	
Decision	91/TTg,	to	group	about	half	of	the	SOEs	under	a	number	of	large-
size	umbrella	companies	known	as	General	Corporations	(GC).	Decision	90	
(issued	on	March	7,	1994)	created	76	GCs,	usually	called	GC90,	each	with	at	
least	5	voluntary	members	and	minimum	legal	capital	of	VND100bn,	and	De-
cision	91	called	for	much	larger	corporations	with	at	least	7	SOEs	members	and	
a	minimum	capital	of	VND1000bn,	resulted	in	only	17	GCs,	which	are	called	
GC91.	All	17	GC91	and	76	GC90	combined	have	a	total	members	of	1,392	
SOEs,	accounting	for	24	of	all	SOEs	in	terms	of	number	and	66	and	55	in	terms	
of	capital	and	employees,	respectively.
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of. this. organizational. form. (Ghemawat. and. Khanna,. 1998;.
Granovetter,. 1994;. Guillen,. 2000;. Khanna. and. Palepu,. 1997)..
These. studies. suggest. that. business. groups. act. as. substitutes. for.
imperfect.capital,.labor,.and.product.markets.in.many.countries,.
thereby.enjoying.competitive.advantages.that.are.not.available.to.
independent.firms.(Leff,.1978)..These.groups.have.typically.been.
viewed. through.a. transaction.cost.economics.perspective.where.
they. are. perceived. as. responses. to. inefficiencies. in. the.market..
Moreover,.the.recent.literature.on.Chinese.business.groups.is.also.
reviewed.here.to.shed.light.on.the.issues.relevant.for.Vietnam.
4.4.1 A Snapshot of Vietnam’s Large Economic Groups 
Defining Large Economic Groups in Vietnam
Defining.a.business.group.is.not.a.simple. task.since.group.
definition.varies.substantially.across.countries.(Khanna,.2000)..
As.pointed.out.by.Chang.(2002),. the.exact. features.of.business.
groups. differ. from. one. country. to. another. because. of. distinct.
economic,.social,.and.cultural.environments..However,.they.have.
important. similarities,. and. the. most. notable. is. that. “business.
groups. pursue. unrelated. diversification. under. centralized.
control”.1. In. most. countries,. group. membership. is. typically.
informal.and.Chile.is.one.of.the.few.countries.in.which.groups.
are.legally.defined.entities.(Khanna.and.Palepu,.1999)..There.are.a.
number.of.business.group.definitions.in.the.literature..Leff.(1978).
1.	 Khanna	and	Yafeh	(2005)	describe	several	types	of	business	groups.	“In	some,	
equity	 ties	 play	 a	 central	 role:	 among	 these,	 there	 are	 vertically-controlled	
groups	 (“pyramids”),	 and	 there	 are	 horizontally-linked	 groups,	where	 cross	
shareholdings	are	important.	In	other	business	groups,	 in	addition	to	formal	
(for	example,	equity)	ties,	informal	ties	are	important:	group	firms	can	be	re-
lated	to	each	other	through	family	and	social	ties,	a	common	sense	of	identity,	
trade	relations,	and	other	dimensions.	In	certain	countries,	business	groups	are	
a	politically	important	force;	in	others	less	so.	And	some	groups	are	deeply	in-
volved	in	banking	and	financial	services,	whereas	others	are	not.	Nevertheless,	
operation	across	 a	 large	number	of	 (often	unrelated)	 industries	 (diversifica-
tion),	and	family	ownership	combined	with	varying	degrees	of	participation	by	
outside	investors	are	common	characteristics	of	many	business	groups	around	
the	world.”
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refers. to.a.business.groups.as. “a.group.of.companies. that.does.
business.in.different.markets.under.a.common.administrative.or.
financial.control’’.and.states.that.group.members.are.“linked.by.
relations.of.interpersonal.trust,.on.the.basis.of.a.similar.personal,.
ethnic.or.commercial.background”..Granovetter.(1994).defines.a.
business.group.as.“a.collection.of.firms.bound.together.in.some.
formal.and/or. informal.ways”..Khanna.and.Rivkin. (2001). state.
that. a. business. group. is. a. “set. of. firms. which,. though. legally.
independent,.are.bound.together.by.a.constellation.of.formal.and.
informal.ties.and.are.accustomed.to.taking.coordinated.action.”.
There.are.still.other.definitions.of.a.business.group.in.country-
specific.studies..
Defining. large. economic. groups. or. business. groups. in.
Vietnam.is.even.more.difficult.due.to.the.existence.of.both.state-
owned.and.large.private.economic.groups..In.Vietnam,.there.are.
two. kinds. of. business. group:. (i). State-owned. economic. group;.
and.(ii).private.economic.group..At.the.moment,.the.state-owned.
economic. group. is. officially. defined. by. law.. According. to. the.
current.laws.and.regulations,.state-owned.economic.groups.will.
be.established.according.to.the.Decree.No..101/2009/NĐ-CP.on.
the. pilot. implementation. of. establishment. of. economic. group,.
dated.5.November.2009,.a.state-owned.economic.group.is.a.large-
scale.group.of. companies. associated.with.each.other.under. the.
parent-affiliate. structure,. creating. a. consortium. of. enterprises.
bonded. by. economic,. technology,. market. and. other. business.
services.(Article.4.1).
As. at. June. 2010,. there. are. 12. large. state-owned. economic.
groups. and. 11. large. state-owned. corporations.1.Most. of. the. 12.
state-owned. economic. groups. are. established. from. large. state-
owned.corporations..The.structure.of. the.state-owned.economic.
groups.is.mostly.of.a.parent-affiliate.structure.with.a.100.percent.
state-owned.parent.company.and.a.number.of.affiliate.firms..The.
ownership.of.affiliate.firms.may.vary.and.the.parent.company.in.
1.	 http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page?_pageid=517,33802599&_
dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL	(access	on	25	June	2010).
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many.cases.owned.up.to.100.percent.equity..In.contrast.to.the.state-
owned.economic.group,.the.laws.and.regulations.on.the.legal.form.
and.establishment.of.private. economic.group.have.not.yet.been.
issued.although.private.economic.groups.may/do.exist.informally.
or.are.under.the.process.of.formation.and.this.is.consistent.with.
natural. progression. and. international. practices.1. . Besides. the.
state-owned. large. economic.groups,. recently. there.has.been. the.
emergence. of. large. private. economic. groups. such. as. Viet-A;.
Sunfat,.Hoa.Phat,.and.Nam.Cuong.Dong.Tam,.FPT,.Hoanh.Anh.
Gia.Lai,.Kinh.Do,.Hoang.Long,.and.T&T.2.
Large Economic Groups: Origin and Economic Power in 
Vietnam
The.concept.of.economic.group.is.new.to.Vietnam..The.first.
reference.to.the.concept.of.economic.group.was.in.the.Enterprise.
Law.which.came.into.effect.in.2006..However,.the.definition.of.
such.an.economic.organization.was.only.vaguely.defined.3.Only.
with.the.Decree.No..101/2009/NĐ-CP.issued.by.the.government.
on. the. pilot. implementation. of. establishment. of. state-owned.
economic. groups,. dated. 5.November. 2009,. did. the. concept. of.
state-owned. economic. groups. become. clearer.. Still,. it. leaves.
the. concept. of. private. economic. groups. undefined.. To. fully.
understand.the.evolution.of.the.state-owned.economic.groups.in.
Vietnam.it.is.necessary.to.relate.it.to.the.course.of.state-owned.
enterprise.reform...
1.	 http://dddn.com.vn/28361cat97/tap-doan-kinh-te.htm	 and	 http://news.
vneconomy.vn/20100524110942816P0C1/natural-progression.htm	
2.	 See	 http://www.toquoc.gov.vn/Thongtin/Kinh-Te/Tap-Doan-Kinh-Te-Tu-
Nhan-Dang-O-Dau.html	 http://www.sggp.org.vn/kinhte/2010/3/220622/	
http://www.xaluan.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&s
id=169864	
	 http://vietnambusiness.asia/solutions-to-develop-economic-groups-dis-
cussed/	
	 http://vietnambusiness.asia/state-owned-economic-groups-unclearness-in-
governance/	
3.	 http://bee.net.vn/channel/2043/201007/Co-nen-thanh-lap-cac-tap-doan-
kinh-te-1758513/	
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Like. the. SOE. sectors. in. other. former. socialist. countries,.
the. SOEs. in. Vietnam. are. often. associated. with. inefficiency,.
corruption,.and.unfair.competition.against.the.private.sector..In.
Vietnam,.SOEs.are.being.given.many.advantages.and.preferential.
treatment.as.compared.to.private.enterprises.in.terms.of.access.
to. credit,. land. use. rights,. trade. protection,. etc.. Despite. these.
advantages,.their.performance.has.been.disappointing.1.Attempts.
to.reform.Vietnam’s.state-owned.enterprise.sector,.i.e..equitizing.
state-owned.enterprises.—.or.converting.them.into.joint.stock/
limited. liability. companies,. began. as. early. as. mid-1992,. but.
progress.was.very. slow.2.According. to. the. latest.data. from.the.
Ministry.of.Finance.(MOF),.as.of.31.December.2009,.5112.SOEs.
had. been. converted/equitized.. By. 2010,. the. Government. has.
plans. to. convert. the. remaining. 1,500. SOEs,. of.which. 948. are.
proposed.for.equitization..The.equitization.process.of.Vietnam.
is.characterized.by.slow.progress.as.is.evident.in.Table.4.11.and.
by.July.2010.Vietnam.would.not.meet.the.target.that. it.set. for.
itself..Most.of. the.SOEs.equitized.up.to.2006.were.small,.with.
46percent.having.capital.of.less.than.VND5.billion,.though.the.
size.increased.marginally.over.time..The.state.has.often.retained.
a.share.of.more.than.50.percent.in.equitized.SOEs.3.
 
1.	 Their	failures	were	attributed	to	such	factors	as	the	lack	of	management	auton-
omy	and	entrepreneurship	(director	or	managers	of	SOEs	typically	behave	as	
bureaucrats	rather	than	entrepreneurs),	soft	budget	constraints,	self-sufficien-
cy	and	also	in	many	cases,	the	lack	of	competition.	Reform	of	SOEs	became	
essential	(Tran	Van	Tho	2002).	
2.	 After	5	years	of	reform	by	the	end	of	1997,	only	17	enterprises	had	been	equi-
tized.
3.	 Different	 from	 the	 equitization	 in	China,	 there	 are	 few	 outside	 investors	 in	
Vietnam’s	equitized	SOEs.	Early	equitization	was	primarily	internal,	with	em-
ployees	acquiring	more	than	half	the	shares	in	the	equitized	SOE.	The	govern-
ment	and	employees	together	held	almost	80%	of	the	shares.	Very	few	outsid-
ers	such	as	strategic	investors	were	involved.	Over	time,	the	stake	of	employees	
declined	modestly	while	that	of	company	outsiders	increased,	reflecting	in	part	
the	introduction	of	Decree	187	in	2004,	which	required	equitized	SOEs	to	auc-
tion	shares	to	the	public.		
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Table 4.11: State-owned Enterprise Conversions, Cumulative and 
Planned, 2007–2010
Item SOEs..converted
Of.which.
equitized
Cumulative.until.31.December.2007 4,979. 3,369.
Year..2005 724
Year..2006 640
Year..2007 150
Planned.2008–2010. 1,535. 948.
Year.2008. 73
Year.2009 60
Remaining.to.be.converted/equitized.
until.July.2010
1500.including.8.large.
economic.groups.
and.80.state.general.
corporation
 Sources: Ministry of Finance, Government of Vietnam, 2008 and 
various public media sources.
In. response. to. the. slow. progress. in. reforming. the. SOE.
sector,. the. government. started. to. establish. large. state-owned.
economic.groups. in.an.attempt. to. speed.up.and. revitalize. the.
momentum. of. the. state-owned. enterprise. reform.. The. state-
owned. economic. groups. are. sometime. considered. as. a. new.
bottle. for. an. old.wine. of. large. corporations. 90. and. 91..These.
corporations.were.established.in.1990.and.1991.as.a.measure.to.
reform.the.SOE.sector.and.often.referred.to.as.corporations.90.
and.corporations.91.1.
In.East.Asia,.business.groups.are.playing. important.roles. in.
the.national.economy..The.top.30.business.groups.accounted.for.
40. percent. of. Korea’s. output. in. the.mining. and.manufacturing.
1.	 See	http://www.vnn.vn/kinhte/2005/06/460353/	
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sectors.and.14.percent.of.GNP.in.1996..Similarly,.business.groups.
that.were.listed.on.the.stock.exchange.accounted.for.the.following.
exchanges. in. total. market. capitalization. in. 2002;. 24.3. percent.
in.Thailand,.24.9.percent. in.Malaysia,.39.6.percent. in.Singapore.
and. 56.2. percent. in. Taiwan. (Chang,. 2002).. A. natural. question.
to.ask.in.Vietnam.is.the.importance.of.economic.groups.for.the.
national. economy..Unfortunately,. there. is.no. systematic.data.on.
the.economic.groups.in.Vietnam..As.such,.this.section.draws.on.
the.available.data.to.sketch.a.picture.about.Vietnam’s.SOE.sectors.
and.the.large.economic.groups..
As.can.be.seen.in.Table.4.12,.the.number.of.SOEs.has.decreased.
markedly.. Since. 2000. the. SOE. sector. has. seen. its. significance.
reduced. in. both. absolute. and. relative. terms.. In. 2000,. the. SOEs.
account. for. 13.6. percent. of. the. total. number. of. enterprises.. In.
2007,. this. figure. dropped. to. merely. 2.2. percent.. Since. 1998,. a.
series.of. reforms,. including. small.SOE.privatization,. liquidation.
of. insolvent.companies.and.equitization,.has.contributed. to. this.
reduction...
Table 4.12: Vietnam Enterprises by Ownership during 2000-2007
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Number.of.
enterprise 42288 51680 62908 72012 91756 112950 131318 155771
State.owned.
enterprise 5759 5355 5363 4845 4597 4086 3706 3494
Non.State.
owned.
enterprise
35004 44314 55237 64526 84003 105167 123392 147316
FDI 1525 2011 2308 2641 3156 3697 4220 4961
Percentage
Number.of.
enterprise 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
State.owned.
enterprise 13.6 10.4 8.5 6.7 5.0 3.6 2.8 2.2
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Non.State.
owned.
enterprise
82.8 85.7 87.8 89.6 91.6 93.1 94.0 94.6
FDI 3.6 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2
Source: GSO statistical data, various years
The. reduction. in. number. of. enterprises. is. also. reflected. in.
the. decreasing. share. of. the. state-owned. sectors. in. industrial.
output.(Figure.4.5)..By.2007,.the.SOEs.still.account.for.around.20.
percent.of.total.industrial.output..This.reflects.the.concentration.
of.economic.power. in.the.hand.of.SOEs,. i.e..only.2.2.percent.of.
enterprises.accounting.for.20.percent.of.total.industrial.output.
Figure 4.6: Shares of Industrial Output by Ownership
Source: Source: GSO statistical data, various years 
Tables. 4.13. and. 4.14. highlight. further. the. concentration. of.
economic.power.in.a.few.SOEs..As.indicated.by.Tables.4.12.and.
4.13,.the.SOEs.account.for.38.percent.of.the.largest.889.enterprises.
in. terms. of. capital. (with. registered. capital.more. than.VND500.
billion).and.86.enterprises.in.terms.of.the.number.of.employees.
(over.5000. employees)..Figure.4.6. indicates. that. among. the.200.
largest.firms.in.Vietnam,.122.are.SOEs.of.which.19.are.economic.
groups.
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Table 4.13: Distribution of Enterprises by capital and ownership 2007
 
Total.
Capital.(VND.billion)
.<.
0.5
0.5-
1.0 1-5 5-10
10-
50
50-
200
200-
500
Over.
500
Number.of.
enterprises 155771 18646 23631 72342 17269 16353 5286 1355 889
State-
owned.
enterprises.
%
2.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.9 6.6 18.8 32.3 38.0
Non-State.
owned.
enterprises.
%
94.6 99.2 99.4 98.7 94.9 82.8 59.5 41.8 33.0
FDI.% 3.2 0.7 0.5 0.9 3.2 10.6 21.7 25.9 29.0
Source: GSO statistical data, various years
Table 4.14: Distribution of Enterprises by Number of Employees and 
Ownership 2007
 
Total.
No..of.Employees  
Under.5..
employees 9-May Oct-49 50-199
200-
299
300-
499
500-
999
1000-
4999
over 
5000
Number.of.
enterprise 155,771 34,856 51,041 50,588 13,333 1,962 1,694 1,283 928 86
State-owned.
enterprise.% 2.2 0.0 0.1 1.2 9.4 20.6 25.9 27.8 34.7 43.0
Non-State-
owned.
enterprise.%
94.6 99.4 99.3 95.9 79.1 60.0 51.4 43.5 31.3 14.0
FDI.% 3.2 0.5 0.6 2.8 11.5 19.3 22.8 28.7 34.1 43.0
Source: GSO statistical data, various years
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Figure 4.7: Distribution of the 200 Largest Vietnamese Enterprises by 
Ownership
Source: GSO statistical data, various years
Vietnam’s Economic Groups in Comparison with other Countries 
Business. groups. exist. throughout. the. world;. we. can. find.
conglomerates.in.the.West,.“keiretsu”.in.Japan,.Chaebol.in.Korea,.
“grupos.economicos”.in.South.American.countries,.and.“business.
houses”. in. India.. Business. groups. also. emerged. in. the. former.
socialist.European. countries. as. a. result. of. rapid.privatization.of.
state-owned.enterprises.(Khanna.and.Yafeh,.2005)..In.this.section.
we.compare.Vietnam’s.large.economic.groups.with.groups.in.other.
countries,.especially.in.Korea.and.China..In.Vietnam.it.has.been.
argued.that.the.Vietnamese.government.has.admired.the.success.
of.Chaebol.in.Korea’s.economic.development.and.recently.looked.
to.China’s.large.business.groups.and.national.champion.as.a.role.
model. for. Vietnam. economic. group.. A. key. feature. of. China’s.
SOE. reform. is. the. state’s. firm. grip. on. large-scale,. state-owned.
enterprises. (SOEs).1. Similarly,.Vietnam’s. intention. is. to. develop.
1.	 It	would	be	safe	to	state	that	Vietnam	would	imitate	policy	actions	by	Chinese	
government.	
	 http://www.soas.ac.uk/economics/research/workingpapers/file28835.pdf	
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large.economic.groups.in.order.for.the.Party.and.the.Government.
to.control.and.lead.the.economy.toward.socialism..In.particular,.
the. Party,. the. State. and. the.Government.make. it. clear. that. the.
state-owned. economic. sector. will. play. a. leading. and. dominant.
role. in. the.economy..Therefore,. it. is.of.great.value. to. investigate.
the.development.of.large.Chinese.SOEs..
Korea’s Experience with Chaebols
As.discussed.in.Lee.(1997),.Chaebols.are.the.large,.conglomerate.
family-controlled.firms.of.South.Korea.characterized.by.strong.ties.
with. government. agencies..These. government-favored.Chaebols.
had.enjoyed.special.privileges.and.grew.large..By.1996,.the.30.largest.
Chaebols.accounted.for.40.percent.of.Korea’s.total.output.(Ungson,.
Steers. and.Park,. 1997)..1.A. question. that. needs. to. be. addressed.
is.how.the.Chaebols.grew.large.and.how.the.Korean.government.
used.these.Chaebols.for.its.industrialization.purposes?.In.the.early.
phase.of.Korean.economic.development,.Chaebols.were.used.as.
an. effective. tool. for. economic. development. due. to. their. ability.
to. transfer. and. share. financial. resources,. human. resources,. and.
management.know-how.across.subsidiaries.when.external.markets.
were.poorly.developed..Industrialization.in.Korea.started.with.the.
launching.of.the.first.five-year.economic.development.plan.in.1962..
Lacking.adequate.resources,.experience,.and.market.institutions,.
the.government.opted.to.seek.rapid.growth.by.pursuing.initiatives.
to. jump-start. the. industrialization. process.. The. government.
2.	 Chaebol	refers	to	business	association.	There	were	family-owned	enterprises	
in	Korea	in	the	period	before	1961	but	the	particular	state-corporate	alliance	
came	into	being	with	the	regime	of	Park	Chung	Hee	(1961-1979).	From	being	
small/	medium	 size	 firms	which	were	 founded	by	 indigenous	 entrepreneurs	
during	 the	 Japanese	 colonial	 period,	Chaebols	 have	 grown	 rapidly	with	 the	
strategic	support	of	the	state,	bestowed	in	the	course	of	an	unprecedented	eco-
nomic	development	and	the	export-oriented	industrialization	policy	adopted	
by	Park	Chung	Hee	(1961-1979)	regime.	Leading	Chaebols,	such	as	Samsung,	
Hyundai,	LG,	and	Daewoo,	had	over	80	affiliated	companies	each	participating	
in	a	wide	range	of	industries,	including	semiconductors,	consumer	electronics,	
construction,	shipbuilding,	automobiles,	trading,	and	financial	services.	Like	
many	other	business	groups	around	the	world,	each	Chaebol	owned	a	complete	
complement	of	companies	spanning	many	industries.
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designated. “strategic. sectors”. for. the. concentration. of. scarce.
resources..Firms.that.diversified.into.strategic.sectors.in.response.
to.the.government’s.initiative.could.readily.secure.funds,.diversify.
and. renew. their. business. portfolios,. and. emerge. as. Chaebols.
(Korea. Economic. Research. Institute,. 1995).1. On. the. Chaebols’.
side,.in.the.early.period.of.development,.Chaebols.took.advantage.
of.the.abundance.of.new.business.opportunities.while.exploiting.
their. ability. to. overcome. factor. market. imperfections. through.
internal. markets.. In. the. early. period. of. industrialization. with.
abundant.new.business.opportunities,.the.basis.of.competition.was.
the.ability.to.overcome.factor.market.imperfections..With.internal.
markets. for. capital,. labor,. and. intermediate. products,. business.
groups.were.able. to.organize.necessary. resources.and.seize.new.
market.opportunities.rapidly.2...
By. successfully. transforming. from. exporters. of. cheap.
products.to.major.global.players.in.the.past.two.decades,.Chaebols.
have.been.regarded.as.drivers.behind.the.unprecedented.success.
of.the.Korean.economy.(Amsden,.1989;.Chang.and.Hong,.2000)..
However,. the. perception. of. such. large. and. diverse. business.
groups.has.changed.quite.dramatically.in.the.more.recent.period..
Since.the.Asian.Financial.Crisis.in.1997,.Chaebols.in.Korea.have.
been. described. as. excessively. diversified. and. poorly. managed.
organizations.and.accordingly,.seen.as.globally.non-competitive..
1.	 The	government	of	South	Korea	also	used	many	measures	to	protect	its	domes-
tic	market	from	foreign	competition.	Only	until	the	1980s	when	the	domestic	
heavy	industries	experienced	serious	financial	problems,	which	invoked	skepti-
cism	about	the	government’s	capability	of	leading	economic	development	and	
under	the	pressure	by	major	trading	partners	to	liberalize	its	market,	cut	im-
port	tariff	and	reduce	the	government’s	support	to	industry	sectors;	the	South	
Korean	government	shifted	the	government’s	role	from	a	“development”	to	a	
“regulatory”	approach.	
2.	 It	is	safe	to	argue	in	some	cases	that	Chaebols	grew	not	because	they	were	prof-
itable	but	merely	because	they	could	borrow	vast	funds	as	the	government	used	
preferential	 loans	with	 low	 interest	 rates	as	an	 inducement	 for	companies	 to	
invest	in	strategic	sectors.	Such	loans	had	been	the	dominant	source	of	capital	
for	companies.	For	instance,	government	policy	loans	to	these	strategic	sectors	
accounted	for	63	percent	of	total	bank	loans	and	constituted	a	majority	of	the	
investments	in	heavy	industries	(Kim,	1997).	
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As.a.result,.some.scholars.argued.for.the.break-up.of.Chaebols.to.
improve.national.competitiveness..The.government.forced.many.
Chaebols.to.restructure.their.business.portfolios..In.fact,.the.1997.
Financial.Crisis.has.brought.vast.changes. to.many.Chaebols..Of.
the. largest. 30. Chaebols. in. 1996,. about. half. of. them. have. gone.
through.bankruptcy.proceedings.or.bank-sponsored.restructuring.
programs..Some.Chaebols.have.also.voluntarily. taken.their.own.
restructuring.efforts,.often.on.a.large.scale.
Chinese Policy towards Large State-owned Enterprises
Like. Vietnam,. state-owned. enterprises. (SOEs). played. an.
important. role. in. the. economy. of. China..The. reform. of. state-
owned. enterprises. occurred. contemporaneously. with. the. rapid.
growth.of.the.Chinese.economy.and.contributed.to.raise.the.overall.
competitiveness.of.the.Chinese.economy..This.reform.brought.about.
a.drastic. change. in.China’s. corporate. structure,.with. the.weight.
of.SOEs.in.the.Chinese.economy.declining.1.In.its.move.towards.
privatization,.the.state.had.a.specific.interest.in.the.development.
of. large. companies. and. the. creation. of. business. conglomerates..
At.the.5th.Plenary.Session.of.the.14th.Central.Committee.of.the.
Communist.Party.in.1995,.China.adopted.the.“Zhuada.Fangxiao”.
policy. which.means. “keep. the. large. and. let. the. small. go.”.This.
policy.aimed.for.the.full.privatization.of.small.companies,.which.
comprise.the.majority,.and.the.transformation.of.mid-.and.large-
sized.SOEs.(via.structural.reform).into.public.limited.companies,.
with. the. state. only. playing. the. role. of. shareholder.. China. also.
formulated.a.blueprint.aimed.at.advancing.three.to.five.Chinese.
SOEs.into.the.world’s.top.500.rankings.by.2000...China.also.made.
a.concerted.effort.to.cultivate.its.own.business.conglomerates..By.
1.	 Within	the	industrial	sector,	the	share	of	SOEs	in	the	total	number	of	compa-
nies	stood	at	6.1%	in	2007,	a	sharp	decline	from	39.2%	in	1998,	with	its	share	in	
total	employment	plunging	to	22.1%	in	2007	from	56.1%	in	1998.	In	contrast,	
total	assets	of	SOEs	registered	a	relatively	mild	decline	to	44.8%	in	2007	from	
68.8%	in	1998,	indicating	that	SOEs	still	play	a	major	role	in	the	industrial	sec-
tor.	In	terms	of	total	output,	SOEs	saw	their	share	fall	to	29.5%	in	2007	from	
49.6%	in	1998,	indicating	that	SOE	reform	has	not	yet	been	completed	with	
high	shares	of	output.
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benchmarking.the.industrial.policies.of.Japan.and.Korea.and.their.
highly. efficient. and. competitive. business. groups,. China. aimed.
at.creating.“National.Champion”.companies. that.could.compare.
favorably.with.their.rivals.in.Korea.and.Japan..This.brought.about.
vertical.integration.throughout.major.industries,.which.had.also.
occurred. in. Japan.and.Korea..Mergers.proved. to.be.an.effective.
way.of.fostering.these.business.groups..In.1997.alone,.as.many.as.
3,000.firms.were.merged,.and.15.5.billion.Yuan.worth.of.national.
assets. were. re-distributed.. It. was. during. this. period. that. large-
scale.business.groups.were.created.through.mergers.in.the.areas.of.
petrochemicals,.steel.and.air.transportation.1.
Comparison between Vietnam’s Economic Groups and Other 
Asian Counterparts
There. are. a. number. of. differences. and. similarities. between.
Vietnam’s.economic.groups.and.their.counterparts.in.China.and.
Korea..First,. the.control. system.of.economic.groups. in.Vietnam.
is.different.somewhat.from.that.of.Chaebols.and.similar.to.their.
Chinese.cousins..In.Korea,.the.Chaebols.are.controlled.by.founder.
families.(Chung,.2004)..While.in.Vietnam.like.China,.the.pyramid.
structure.guarantees.centralized.control.over.the.entire.group.
Second,. while. the. large. business. groups. in. other. countries.
became.formidable.due.to.their.innate.competitiveness,.the.large.
1.	 In	a	recent	paper	published	by	the	Wharton	Business	School	in	2006	entitled	
“China:	Reform	from	the	Outside	In”,	the	author	described	a	recent	wave	of	
foreign	purchase	of	equity	in	China’s	biggest	SOEs	and	has	pointed	out	that	by	
letting	foreign	ownership	in	Chinese	SOEs,	the	Chinese	Government	intends	
to	encourage	foreign	ownership	to	bring	in	new	management	approaches,	bet-
ter	incentive	systems,	greater	transparency,	and	a	whole	new	level	of	corporate	
governance.	The	 article	 points	 out	 the	 large	 foreign	 reserve	 by	 the	Chinese	
government	 as	 evidence	 that	 the	Chinese	does	not	need	 investment	 capital.	
Rather,	what	they	are	after	is	‘business	expertise’,	with	a	primary	intention	to	
move	 state-owned	 firms	 to	 sound	commercial	 footing.	By	making	 the	SOEs	
to	become	a	 shareholding	company	 rather	 than	a	wholly	 state-owned	enter-
prise,	the	Chinese	government	subjects	them	to	Chinese	securities	law	which	
require	 to	 install	directors	and	corporate	governance	 systems,	which	 in	 turn	
helps	to	increase	transparency	and	help	companies	become	competitive	in	an	
open	market.			
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economic. groups. in. Vietnam. were. established. mechanically.
through.administrative.fiat.
Third,.while.the.ultimate.goal.of.large.business.groups.in.other.
countries.is.to.serve.the.interest.of.the.shareholders.by.providing.
profit. orientation,. there. is. a. confusion.of. goals. and. roles. in. the.
large.economic.groups.in.Vietnam....
4.4.2 Vietnam’s State-owned Large Economic Groups as 
Industrial Policy  
Since. the.promulgation.of. the.government.plan. to.establish.
large. state-owned. economic. groups. using. large. corporations,.
the. policy. has. been. under. public. scrutiny.. The. rationale. for.
establishing. such. large. economic. groups. has. been. questioned.
from. the. very.beginning.1.More. recently,.with. the.near-collapse.
of. one. of. the. largest. economic. groups,. the. supposed. Vietnam’s.
flagship.shipbuilder.VINASHIN,.the.problems.of.large.economic.
groups.have.been.hotly.debated.in.Vietnam.2..Despite.the.popular.
perception.of. the.economic.groups.being.problem-ridden,. there.
is. yet. no. conclusive. verdict. on. the. economic. roles. played. by.
business.groups.around.the.world.(Khanna.and.Yafeh,.2007)..The.
value.and.the.role.of.business.groups.depend.on.the.institutional.
contexts.in.which.they.are.embedded.(Khanna.and.Rivkin,.2001)..
It.is.therefore.useful.to.review.the.rationale,.roles.and.dangers.of.
large. economic. groups. for. national. economic. development. and.
industrialization.in.Vietnam...
Market Failures and Institutional Voids
The.existence.of.so.many.business.groups.around.the.world,.
especially.in.developing.countries,.points.to.the.important.role.of.
large.economic.groups..Economic.theory.has.it.that.the.emergence.
and. existence. of. business. groups. is. due. to. the. underdeveloped.
1.	 See		http://bee.net.vn/channel/2043/201007/Co-nen-thanh-lap-cac-tap-do-
an-kinh-te-1758513/	and	
	 http://www.vnn.vn/kinhte/2005/06/460353/	
2.	 See	http://vnr500.vietnamnet.vn/content.aspx?id=707	
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nature.of.the.market.mechanism.in.developing.countries.(see.Leff,.
1978;.Goto,. 1982)..The. theoretical. literature. attempts. to. explain.
why.business.groups.would.deviate.from.the.norm.of.specialization.
in. core. competences.. The. market. failure. argument. explains.
business. groups. as. a. logical. response. to. technology. borrowing.
and.economies.of.scope,.capital.and.managerial.scarcity,.and.other.
kinds.of.informational.and.institutional.voids.(Amsden,.2001;.Leff,.
1978;.Khanna.and.Palepu,.1997)...According.to.Khanna.and.Palepu.
(1997),. unlike. developed. countries. where. capital. markets. are.
efficient;.labor.markets.are.well.functioning,.and.product.markets.
are.driven.by.reliable.enforcement.of. liability. laws,.efficient.flow.
of.information.and.proactive.consumers;.developing.countries.are.
characterized. by. inefficient. capital.markets,. lack. of.well-trained.
business.people.in.the.labor.market,.and.lack.of.information.and.
transactions-related.institutions.in.the.product.market..
In. contrast. to. the. advanced. countries. where. rule. of. law. is.
enforced,.in.addition.to.a.competitive.environment.relatively.free.
of.corruption,.and.a.system.of.predictable.contract.enforcement;.
the.governments.in.developing.countries,.including.Vietnam,.are.
highly.bureaucratic.and.hence,.intervene.in.business.extensively..
In. such.a. situation,.business.groups.can.have. superior.access. to.
capital.markets.and.to.internal.labor.and.product.markets..Vietnam.
is.making.its.transition.to.the.market.economy.only.in.the.last.20.
years,.and.market.institutions.are.only.emerging..In.this.context,.
the. emergence. of. large. economic/business. groups. (both. private.
and.state-owned).could.be.viewed.as.an.appropriate.response.to.
inadequate.market.institutions..The.internal.markets.(i.e..capital,.
labor.and.product).allow.affiliate.members.of.such.business.groups.
to.overcome.the.market.failures.in.developing.countries..
In.addition.to.the.typical.institutional.voids.identified.above,.
there. is.a.peculiar. type.of. institutional.void. that.exists. in.China.
and. Vietnam. (and. other. transition. economies),. the. ownership.
void..Ma.et.al..(2006).argue.that.the.ownership.void.exists.due.to.
the. lack.of.unambiguously.specified.ownership.of.state-assets. in.
transition.economy..They.argue.that.the.role.of.business.groups.is.
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to.facilitate.economic.reform.and.corporatization.of.state-owned.
enterprises.. In. China. SOEs. are. owned. by. the. State. and. hence,.
belong.to.all.citizens..But.in.reality,.these.owners.do.not.have.the.
right. to.manage,. control,. use,. transfer. or. sell. the. property.. It. is.
this.particular.situation.that.leads.to.an.ownership.void..Instead,.
these.enterprises.are.run.and.managed.by.state.agents.who.claim.
to.act. in. the. interest.of. the.owners. (citizens).but. in.many.cases.
pursue.their.own.private.benefit.at.the.expense.of.the.owners..It.is.
this.ownership.void.that.is.the.root.cause.for.the.widespread.poor.
performance.of.SOEs.in.China.(and.also.in.Vietnam)..Under.this.
situation,. the. economic.groups. are. created. to.fill. the.ownership.
void..These.business.groups.are.“created. to.serve.as. the.second-
order. but. direct. owners. of. Chinese. SOEs. in. the. institutional.
transition. and. ownership. transformation. process”. (Mat. et. al.,.
2006,.p..472).....
Large Economic Groups as a Device for Industrial Policy and 
Economic Catch-up
Can.large.economic.groups.in.general.and.state-owned.groups.
in.particular.be.developed.for.the.purpose.of.national.economic.
industrialization. and. catch-up?. Despite. its. potential. problems,.
economic/business. groups. in. general. can.be.used. for. economic.
catch-up,. i.e.. implementing. industrial. policy..The. Korean. case,.
discussed. above,. is. a. good. example.. When. Korea. started. its.
industrialization.in.the.early.1960s,.it.was.evident.that.its.growth.
potential.was.seriously.constrained.by.limited.financial.resources..
To. overcome. such. constraints,. it. was. a. reasonable. solution. to.
pool.the.capital.into.just.a.few.big.businesses..In.other.words,.the.
Korean.government.promoted.a.small.number.of.big.businesses.to.
expedite. economic.growth..Therefore,. the. spectacular. economic.
performance.achieved. in.Korea.has.often.been.attributed. to. the.
growth.of.big.business.groups..More.recently,.it.is.China,.another.
catching-up.economy,.that.has.been.successful.in.promoting..the.
development. of. the. big. business. groups. for. national. economic.
catch-up,.while.there.bottom-up,.the.SME.sector.has.also.played.
an. important. role. (Lee. and.Woo,. 2002).. For. the. case. of.China,.
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Keister.(1998).is.the.first.to.conduct.an.in.depth.study.to.analyze.
how. and. why. Chinese. business. groups. were. formed. and. what.
impact. their. formation. has. had. on. economic. performance.. She.
suggests. that. the. formation. of. Chinese. business. group. was. a.
strategy.of.the.government.to.reform.SOEs.and.she.described.how.
the. government. actively. encouraged. the. formation. of. business.
groups.in.China.and.protected.them.from.competition.
How. could. state-owned. economic. groups. be. drivers. of.
economic.growth.and.development.despite.the.popular.perception.
that.the.larger.the.SOE.sector.the.less.efficient.and.dynamic.they.
are?..As.pointed.out.by.Chang.(2007),.there.is.no.clear.theoretical.
case. either. for. or. against. SOEs. –. the. performance. of. private.
sector.firms.will.only.be.superior.to.SOEs.only.under.restrictive.
condition. as. shown. by. the. Sappington-Stiglitz. fundamentals. of.
privatization.theorem.and.that.the.problems.faced.by.large.SOEs.
and.large.private.enterprises.are.the.same..There.can.be.successful.
large.SOEs.as.well.as.failures.1.In.terms.of.real.case.evidence,.there.
are. evidences. from. East. Asian. and. European. countries2. that. it.
is.not. simply. that. their.SOE.sectors.are.big,.but. they.have.been.
most.dynamic,.and.have.led.the.modernization.of.their.industries..
Taiwan. has. one. of. the. largest. public. enterprise. sectors. in. the.
non-oil-producing. world.. The. Taiwanese. SOEs. were. mostly. in.
the. upstream. sectors. producing. intermediate. inputs,. and. their.
efficiency.has.contributed.to.the.competitiveness.of.the.country’s.
downstream.industries.which.use.their.products.as.inputs.(Wade,.
1990)..The.Taiwanese.government.also.started.some.risky,.high-
technology. SOEs. and. spun. off. private. sector. firms. from. them,.
with. some. of. the. leading. semi-conductor. firms. in. the. country.
were.created.in.this.way..Examples.of.successful.and.efficient.large.
1.	 The	government	can	implement	industrial	policy	through	large	SOEs	in	such	
cases	as	(i)	natural	monopoly;	(ii)	market	failure	(capital,	labor);	(iii)	exter-
nality	and	(iv)	equity.	The	reasons	that	may	underscore	SOEs	failure	include;	
free-rider	problem,	principle-agency	problem,	and	soft-budget	constraints.
2.	 According	 to	Chang	 (2006)	many	of	 the	 countries	which	 actively	practiced	
industrial	policies	have	used	state-owned	enterprises	extensively.	France,	Aus-
tria,	and	Norway	all	had	large	SOE	sectors
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SOEs.can.be. found. in.many.countries. around. the.world.and. in.
the. region,1. i.e.. POSCO,. the. steel. producer. in.Korea,. Singapore.
Airlines.in.Singapore,.and.Thai.Airways.in.Thailand.
Problems Associated with Large Economic Groups for Vietnam
Agency.problems.and.costs:.Like.any. formal.business,. large.
economic. groups. have. to. deal. with. the. agency. problems.. The.
agency. cost. here. could. be. shareholder-manager. agency. costs,.
the.debtor-manager.agency.costs,.and.employment.agency.costs..
Depending.on.whether.the.economic.group.is.privately.owned.or.
state-owned,.the.agency.costs.may.vary..The.agency.problem.arises.
when. there. is. a. separation. between. owners. and.managers. of. a.
business.as.the.managers.would.seek.to.fulfill.their.own.objectives.
rather.than.those.of.owners..This.type.of.agency.cost.problem.is.
inherent.not.only.in.state-owned.large.economic.groups.but.also.
in.private.owned.(including.publicly.owned).firms.and.business.
groups.. In.Vietnam,. the. public. held. business. group. is. relatively.
few. in. number.. For. the. state-owned. large. economic. groups. in.
Vietnam,.they.also.suffer.from.the.agency.problem.of.separation.
between.ownership.and.control..But.the.problem.for.state-owned.
group.is.even.worse.due.to.the.ownership.void.briefly.discussed.
above..The.owners.are.citizens.but.the.groups.are.controlled.and.
run.by.politicians.or.managers.appointed.by.politicians..As.a.result,.
state-owned.large.economic.groups.and.corporations.are.charged.
with. tasks. such. as. macroeconomic. stabilization. that. have. little.
business.value..And.this.complicates.the.issue.of.accountability.2.
3.	 Of	course,	this	is	not	to	suggest	that	an	effective	industrial	policy	regime	re-
quires	a	large	SOE	sector.	Japan	is	an	important	exception	to	this	pattern	that	
proves	this	point.	While	Japan’s	SOE	sector	is	not	exceptionally	small,	it	is	not	
very	large	either,	and	in	manufacturing	industries,	the	role	of	SOEs	has	been	
minimal.
1.	 http://www.hanoimoi.com.vn/newsdetail/Kinh_te/313459/anh-ca-do-
khoe-chinh-phu-moi-khoe.htm	
	 http://www.tin247.com/thu_tuong_trieu_tap_lanh_dao_cac_tap_
doan%2C_tong_cong_ty_nha_nuoc_ban_giai_phap_kiem_che_lam_phat-
3-66307.html	
	 http://www.tin247.com/thu_tuong_yeu_cau_cac_tap_doan_khong_duoc_
tang_gia!-3-1018.html	
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Further,.the.separation.of.ownership.and.control.may.also.lead.to.
the.pursuit.of.other.objective.such.as.empire-building.rather.than.
profit.making,.i.e..focusing.on.growth.1
In. addition,. large. economic. groups. are. not. disciplined. by.
market. forces. because. the. politicians. that. run. them. have. the.
power.to.regulate.the.industry,.or.the.state-owned.large.economic.
groups.that.have.political.connections.and.power.that.allow.them.
to.ignore.regulations..In.Vietnam,.this.problem.is.even.worse.as.
many.people.have.questioned.whether. the.government.agencies.
and. ministries. have. any. power. over. large. economic. groups.2.
Another. problem. associated. with. large. state-owned. economic.
groups.is.the.soft.budget.constraint.(Kornai,.1986)..
Restructuring the State-owned Enterprises and Large 
Economic Groups – The Way Forward
The.analysis. and. review.of. the. literature. above.have. shown.
that. large. economic. groups. could.potentially. play. an. important.
role. for. Vietnam’s. economic. development.. However,. evidence.
has. also. shown. that. using. such. large. economic. groups. as. an.
instrument.for.implementing.industrial.policy.is.not.an.easy.task..
The. recent. near-collapse. of. Vinashin. highlights. the. potential.
risks,.challenges,.problems.and.costs.associated.with.establishing,.
managing,. controlling. and. using. large. economic. groups.. It. also.
calls.for.a.more.systematic,.more.disciplined.and.more.innovative.
approach.in.the.governance.of.large.economic.groups..Although.a.
systematic.and.comprehensive.analysis.is.beyond.the.scope.of.this.
chapter,.however. attempts.have.been.made. to. review. the. recent.
literature.on.state-owned.corporate.governance.in.China.in.order.
to. shed. some. light. on. the. problems. that. Vietnam. is. facing.. A.
number.of.points.are.worth.noting:.
Khanna. and. Palepu. (1999). point. out. that. by. simply.
dismantling. the. large. and. diversified. large. economic. groups.
2.	 http://vneconomy.vn/20100311102242340P0C9920/thu-tuong-tap-doan-
tong-cong-ty-nha-nuoc-can-tang-truong-it-nhat-10.htm	
1.	 See	http://vnexpress.net/GL/Kinh-doanh/2010/07/3BA1DF1E/.
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in. order. to. reduce. the. huge. debt. problem,. reduce. inefficiency,.
promote.entrepreneurship,.and.to.create.more.focus.and.efficient.
enterprises.may.not.work.due.to.the.institutional.void.discussed.
above..Instead,.these.authors.suggest.a.number.of.alternatives..At.a.
more.general.level,.they.suggest.building.a.market.infrastructure,.
especially.soft.infrastructure..At.a.more.specific.level,.they.suggest.
reforming. business. practices. –. accountability. and. corporate.
governance..
4.5 Conclusions and Future Directions for Research
As. pointed. out. earlier,. Vietnam. is. now. at. the. critical.
juncture. of. its. economic. development. as. the. country. moves.
from. a. low-income. country. to. a. lower-middle-income. country..
During. the. last. few. decades,. the. government. has. implemented.
many. economic. reforms. successfully.. However,. the. new. global.
economic. environment. and. the. new. middle. income. context.
pose. the. question. if.Vietnam. could. continue. its. current. course.
of. economic. development. and. avoid. the. middle-income. trap..
This.chapter.closely.examines.the.empirical.concept.of.industrial.
policy. and. its. relevance. for. Vietnam’s. economic. development..
Review. of. relevant. sources. shows. that. Vietnam. has. not. had. a.
consistent. and. well-defined. industrial. policy/strategy.. The. last.
few. decades. of. Vietnam’s. economic. development. policy. can. be.
more. characterized. as. market-development. reform. (including.
institution.building.measures).rather.than.selective.interventionist.
policy. of. the. Korean,. Malaysia,. Taiwan. types,. although. the.
government.did.have.some.ad.hoc.interventionist.policies..In.the.
new.global.economic.environment,.Vietnam.may.not.have.all.the.
selective.industrial.policies.that.were.available.to.other.countries..
Instead,.one.of.the.very.important.tools.for.Vietnam.to.implement.
its. industrial.policy. is. the. large. economic.groups,. especially. the.
large.SOEs..However,.they.are.a.double-edged.sword.that.can.only.
be.used.effectively.and.safely.in.the.hand.of.a.good.master.
..
266
References
Amsden,.A..1989..Asia’s Next Giant,.Oxford.University.Press,.New.
York.
Athukorala,.P-C..(2006)..“Trade.Policy.Reforms.and.the.Structure.
of.Protection.in.Vietnam”,..The World Economy,.Vol..29(2):.161-187..
Bjorvatn,. K.. and.Coniglio,.N.D.. (2007).. “How. should. Industrial.
Policy.be.Designed.in.Developing.Countries?”.Dipartimento.di.Scienze.
Economiche.e.Metodi.Matematici.-.Università.di.Bari.No..0014..http://
www.dse.uniba.it/Quaderni/SERIES/WP_0014.pdf.
Bui. Trinh. (2010).. “Measuring. the. Effective.Rate. of. Protection. in.
Vietnam’s.Economy.with.Emphasis.on.the.Manufacturing.Industry:.An.
Input-output.Approach”,.Depocen.Working.Paper.Series,.No..2010/12,.
Development. and. Policies. Research. Center. (DEPOCEN). http://
depocenwp.org/upload/pubs/BuiTrinh/ERP_Paper_DEPOCENWP.pdf.
Crafts,.Nicholas.. 1998.. “East.Asian.Growth.Before.and.After. the.
Crisis.”.Washington,.D.C.:.International.Monetary.Fund.Working.Paper.
WP/98/137.
Chang,.H-J..(2002)..Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy 
in Historical Perspective,.London:.Anthem.Press.
Chang,. H-J.. 1994.. The Political Economy of Industrial Policy,.
Mcmillan,.London.and.Basingstoke.
Chang. S-J.. (2006).. “Business. Groups. in. East. Asia:. Post-crisis.
Restructuring.and.New.Growth”,.Asia Pacific Journal of Management,.
Vol..23(4):.407–417.
Chang,.S.J.,.and.J..Hong,.2000..“Economic.Performance.of.the.Group-
affiliated.Companies. in.Korea:.Resource.Sharing.and.Internal.Business.
transactions”,.Academy of Management Journal..43:.pp.429-448.
Cheng,. Y.S.. and. Lo,. D.. (2004). “Firm. Size,. Technical. Efficiency.
and.Productivity.Growth.in.Chinese.Industry”,.School.of.Oriental.and.
African.Studies.University.of.London,.working.paper.No..144,.http://
www.soas.ac.uk/economics/research/workingpapers/file28835.pdf
Chung,. . K.,. 2004,. “Business. Groups. in. Japan. and. Korea”,.
International Journal of Political Economy,.Vol..34,No.3,pp67-98.
Ghemawat,.P..and.Khanna,.T...(1998)...“The.Nature.of.Diversified.
267
Groups:.A.Research.Design.and.Two.Case.Studies.”.Journal of Industrial 
Economics.
George,. B.C.. (2008).. “Corporate. Governance. Principles. and.
Practice.in.Emerging.Countries..Case.of.Romania”,.paper.presented.at.
MIBES.2008.
Granovetter,.M.. . (1994).. . “Business.Groups.”. .Chapter.18. in.N.J..
Smelser. and. R.. Swedberg. (ed.).. . Handbook of Economic Sociology..
Princeton,.NJ:.Princeton.University.Press.and.New.York:.Russell.Sage.
Foundation.
Guillén,.M...(1997)...“Business.Groups.in.Economic.Development.”.
Academy.of.Management.Proceedings.
Haque,. I.U.. (2007).. “Rethinking. Industrial. Policy”,. UNCTAD.
Discussion. Papers. No.. 183.. http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
osgdp20072_en.pdf.
Hiraga,. T.. (2009). “Developments. in. Corporate. Governance. in.
Asia—. The. Case. of. Korea’s”. LG. Group,. NLI. Research,. Insurance.
Research.Group.&.Economic.Research.Group..http://www.nli-research.
co.jp/english/socioeconomics/2010/li100125.pdf
 Jeon,.Y-D..and.Kim,.Y-Y..(2004)..“Conglomerates.and.Economic.
Calculation”,.The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics,. Vol.. 7(1):.
53–64.
Keister,.L..(1998)..“Engineering.Growth:.Business.Group.Structure.
and. Firm. Performance. in. China’s. Transition. Economy.”. American 
Journal of Sociology..104,.pp..404-440.
Khanna,.T..and.Palepu,.K.G..(1997)..“Why.Focused.Strategies.May.
Be.Wrong.for.Emerging.Markets”,.Harvard Business Review,.Vol..75(4):.
41-51.
Khanna,. T.,. and. K.. G.. Palepu.. (1999). “Policy. Shocks,. Market.
Intermediaries,. and. Corporate. Strategy:. Evidence. from. Chile. and.
India.”.Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.8,.No..2:.271-310.
Khanna,.T.,.&.Rivkin,. J..W.. (2001).. “Estimating. the.Performance.
Effects.of.Business.Groups.in.Emerging.Markets”..Strategic Management 
Journal,.22:.45-74.
Khanna,.T..and.Fisman,.R..(2004)..“Facilitating.Development:.The.
Role.of.Business.Groups”,.World Development,.Vol..32(4):.609-628.
Khanna.T.. and.Yafeh,.Y.. . (2005).. “Business.Groups. in.Emerging.
Markets:. Paragons. or. Parasites?”.Mimeo,. . Harvard. Business. School..
268
http://cei.ier.hit-.ac.jp/activities/seminars/papers/yafehpercent2005.pdf 
Kim,.E..M..(1997),.Big Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in 
South Korean Developments, 1960-1990,.State.University.of.New.York.Press.
Kornai,. J.. (1986).. “The.Soft.Budget.Constraint,”.Kyklos. 39:1,. pp..
3-30.
Lall,.S..(1996)..“Paradigms.of.development:.The.East.Asian.debate,”.
Oxford.Development.Studies,.Taylor.and.Francis. Journals,. vol..24(2),.
pages.111-131.
Lall,. S.. . (2004).. “Reinventing. Industrial. Strategy:. The. Role. of.
Government.Policy.in.Building.Industrial.Competitiveness”,.United.Nations.
conference.on.Trade.and.Development,.G-24.discussion.paper.series.
Lee.Y-H..(1997)..The State, Society and Big Business in South Korea,.
London:.Routledg.
Lee,.K..and.Woo,.W..2002,.“Business.Groups.in.China:.Compared.
with.Korean.Chaebols,”.in.R..Hooley.and.J..Yoo,.eds..The.post-financial.
Crisis.Challenges.for.Asian.Industrialization,.Elsevier.Sciences,..2001.
Leff,.N..H..(1978)..“Industrial.Organization.and.Entrepreneurship.
in. the. Developing. Countries:. The. Economic. Groups”,. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change,.Vol..26(4):.661-675.
Lin,. J.. and. Chang,. H-J.. (2009).. “DPR. Debate. Should. Industrial.
Policy.in.Developing.Countries.Conform.to.Comparative.Advantage.or.
Defy.it?.A.Debate.between.Justin.Lin.and.Ha-Joon.Chang”,.Development 
Policy Review,.Vol..27.(5):.483-502..
Linn,. J.F.. (2006).. “State. versus. Market:. Forever. a. Struggle?.
Executive.Director,.Wolfensohn.Center.for.Development,.Kommersant,.
,. Brookings. Institution,. available. at. http://www.brookings.edu/
opinions/2006/1023russia_linn.aspx?p=1.
Lo,. D.. and. Smyth,. R.. (2005).. “Industrial. Restructuring. and.
Corporate.Governance.in.China’s.Large-scale.State-owned.Enterprises”,.
in.Smyth,.R.,.Tam,.O.K.,.Warner,.M..and.Zhu,.C.J..(eds),.China’s Business 
Reforms Institutional Challenges in a Globalized Economy,.Milton.Park,.
Abingdon:.Routledge...
Lora,. E.. (2005).. “Should. Latin. America. Fear. China?”. .Working.
Paper.#531,..Research.Department,..Inter-American.Development.Bank..
Ma,.X.,.Yao,.X..and.Xi,.Y..(2006)..“Business.Group.Affiliation.and.
Firm.Performance. in. a.Transition.Economy:.A. Focus. on.Ownership.
Voids,”.Asia Pacific Journal of Management,.Vol..23(4):.467-483.
269
Marcus,.N..and.Pack,.H..(2005)..“The.East.Asian.Industrial.Policy.
Experience:. Implications. for. the.Middle.East”,.paper.prepared. for. the.
ECES. conference. Rethinking the Role of the State: An Assessment of 
Industrial Policy in MENA,.held.in.Cairo,.Egypt.on.November.13,.2005
Mattlin,.M..(2009)..“Chinese.Strategic.State-owned.Enterprises.and.
Ownership.Control,.BICCS.Asia.Paper.Vol..4.(6).
Mayer,.J..and.Wood,.A..(2009)..“Has.China.De-industrialized.other.
Developing. Countries?”,. QEH.Working. Paper. Series. –. QEHWPS175,.
Oxford.University,.http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/qehwp/qehwps175.pdf
Ngo. Trinh. Ha. (2005).. “Catching-up. Industrial. Development. of.
East.Asian.Economies.and.its.Application.to.Vietnam”,.The Journal of 
Developing Areas,.Vol..39(1):.71-98.
Nguyen.Ngoc.Anh,.Nguyen.Duc.Nhat,.Nguyen.Dinh.Chuc. and.
Nguyen.Thang. (2010).. “Surprising. Resilience. but. Challenges.Ahead”.
in.The Great Recession and Developing Countries: Economic Impact and 
Growth Prospects,.pp.545-595,.(eds).Mustapha.K..Nabli,.The.Work.Bank..
Nguyen.Viet. Cuong. (2009).. “Can.Vietnam.Achieve.Millennium.
Development. Goal. on. Poverty. Reduction. in. High. Inflation. and.
Economic.Stagnation?,”.Working.Papers.01,.Development.and.Policies.
Research.Center.(DEPOCEN),.Vietnam.
Ohno,.K..(2010)..“Avoiding.the.Middle.Income.Trap:.Renovating.
Industrial. Policy. Formulation. in. Vietnam”,. Vietnam. Development.
Forum.(VDF),.Hanoi.and.National.Graduate.Institute.for.Policy.Studies.
(GRIPS),.Tokyo.
Pallapa. R.. (2005).. “The. Roles. of. SOEs. in. Thai. Economy,. State.
Enterprise.Policy.Office”,.Ministry.of.Finance,.Thailand.  
Perkins,.D..(2001)...“Industrial.and.Financial.Policy.in.China.and.
Vietnam:. A.New.Model. or. a. Replay. of. the. East. Asian. Experience?”,.
Chapter.6.-.Rethinking.the.East.Asia.Miracle,.edited.by.Joseph.Stiglitz.
and.Shahid.Yusuf,.World.Bank.2001.
Perkins,.D..H..and.Vu.Thanh.Tu.Anh..(2009)..“Vietnam’s.Industrial.
Policy.Designing.Policies.for.Sustainable.Development”,..Policy.Dialogue.
Paper.Number.1,.Harvard.University.http://www.innovations.harvard.
edu/cache/documents/6533/653316.pdf..
Ravenhill,. J.. (2006).. “Is.China. an.Economic.Threat. to. Southeast.
Asia?”.Asian Survey,.Vol..46(5):.653-674.
Rodrik. D.. (2008).. “Normalizing. Industrial. Policy”,. Working.
270
Paper.No.. 3,.Commission.on.Growth. and.Development.. http://www.
growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gc-wp-003_web.pdf.
Schneider,.B.R..(2010)..“Business.Groups.and.the.State:.The.Politics.
of.Expansion,.Restructuring,.and.Collapse”,.in.Coplan,.A.M.,.Hikino,.T..
and.Lincoln,.J.R..(eds),.The Oxford Handbook on Business Groups,.New.
York:.Oxford.University.Press.
Schneider,. B.R.. (2008).. “A. Comparative. Political. Economy. of.
Diversified. Business. Groups,. or. How. States. Organize. Capitalism.”.
Review of International Political Economy.23(26):.1-24..
SRV.(Socialist.Republic.of.Vietnam).(2003)..“The.Comprehensive.Poverty.
Reduction.and.Growth.Strategy”,.Government.Office,.Hanoi,.November.
Szirmai,. A.,. (2008).. “Explaining. Success. and. Failure. in.
Development,”. UNU-MERIT. Working. Paper. Series. 013,. United.
Nations. University,. Maastricht. Economic. and. social. Research. and.
training.centre.on.Innovation.and.Technology..http://www.merit.unu.
edu/publications/wppdf/2008/wp2008-013.pdf.
Tran. Van.Tho. (2002)..Vietnamese Gradualism in Reforms of the 
State-Owned Enterprises,.Waseda.University,.Tokyo.
Ungson,.G.,.Steers,.R,.and.Park,.S..H.. (1997)..Korean Enterprise: 
The Quest for Globalization..Harvard.Business.School.Publishing.Press:.
Boston,..Massachusetts
Valila,.T..(2009)..“No.Policy.is.an.Island.-.on.the.Interaction.between.
Industrial. and. other. Policies”,. European. Investment. Bank,. Working.
paper.. http://www.eib.org/attachments/efs/eibpapers/eibpapers_2006_
v11_n02/eibpapers_2006_v11_n02_a01_en.pdf.
Wade,.R..(1990)..Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role 
of Government in East Asian Industrialization,.Princeton.University.Press.
Winters,.A..and.Yusuf,.S...(2007)..Dancing with Giants: China, India 
and the Global Economy,.The.World.Bank.
Wiemann,.J.,.Effner,.H.,.Grammling,.S.,.Henke,.K.,.Kommer,.C..and.
Mühlich,.L..(2006)..“Vietnam.–.The.150th.WTO-Member:.Implications.
for.Industrial.Policy”,.German.Development.Institute..
Wong,. Poh-Kam,. and. Chee-Yueng. Ng,. (eds.). 2001.. Industrial 
Policy, Innovation and Economic Growth: The Experience of Japan and 
the Asian NIEs. Singapore:.Singapore.UniversityPress.
Yusuf,.S.,.Altaf,.M..A.,.Nabeshima,.K..(2004)..“Global.Production.
Networking.and.Technological.Change.in.East.Asia”,.The.World.Bank.
